In Game 3 of the NBA Finals, the San Antonio Spurs made a Finals record 16 three pointers en route to the third largest victory in Finals history. Other factors contributed to the victory but it was the three point shooting, led by Danny Green, 7-for-9, and Gary Neal, 6-fo-10, that blew open the game.
The 16-of-32 three point shooting is incredible but more significant is the ease with which San Antonio found open three point opportunities.
The Spurs understand Miami’s defensive system and are able to take advantage of its flaws. Here is an example indicative of a common breakdown in the Miami defense.
This is a variation on the “Loop” set San Antonio often runs. After passing to Manu Ginobili at the top of the court, Tony Parker runs through a series of screens, curls towards the ball, and receives a pass from Ginobili. San Antonio knows that Miami is a very aggressive pick and roll trapping team. The loop often flows directly into a pick and roll with the last screener serving as the roll man after Parker makes the catch.
On this play, Duncan expects Chris Bosh to trap Parker off his screen and immediately drops into post-position. Parker makes a nice pass into Tim Duncan, getting him the ball before Bosh is able to recover. This forces LeBron James to switch off Kawhi Leonard to guard Tim Duncan, leaving Dwyane Wade to defend Leonard.
Leonard instantly recognizes that Miami has overloaded the strong side and moves to basket, forcing Wade to stay tightly on him. This leaves Mike Miller to defend both Ginobili, his original man, and Danny Green, now in the corner. Duncan, and excellent passer, finds Ginobili, who swings the ball to Green for a wide-open corner three.
San Antonio uses a clever misdirection to further take advantage of Miami’s defense. On a typical Loop set, Green would be positioned in the left corner. At the beginning of the play, he appears to be headed to this spot but stops at the post area near Tim Duncan. Green than fakes as if he were setting a screen, another common variation of the Loop, but cuts back and runs to the opposite corner.
Thought this shot was missed, San Antonio was able to find open opportunities out of similar sets designed to take advantage of Miami’s pick and roll traps.
So, what does this have to do with the Warriors?
To achieve future success, the Warriors will have to consistently overcome defenses geared to stop them. Like San Antonio has done to Miami, the Warriors must be able to acknowledge and take advantage of defensive tendencies, a test in both innovation and execution.
“Spurs basketball” has become synonymous with “efficiency”, and “playing to your strengths,” and, as much as even Tim Duncan, Tony Parker embodies San Antonio’s core values. As control of the offense shifted from Tim Duncan to him, Parker has expanded his offensive game, but only within the boundaries of efficiency. Though a late season ankle injury derailed his bid, Tony Parker was among the lower-ranking MVP candidates throughout the season.
Parker, along with most other Spurs, rarely attacks without advantage. Of course, a player a skilled and quick as Parker finds himself able to create advantageous situations far more than most players. According to Synergy, Parker ranks 14th in the league in isolation points per play, 24th off-screens, 15th in hand-off situations, 2nd on cuts, and 11th in the bread, butter, jam, plate, and accompanying glass of milk of his offense, the pick and roll. The pick and roll comprises 46.2% of Parker’s offensive possessions, and is the main the central component of San Antonio’s offense. San Antonio, which finished seventh in regular season offensive efficiency, either finishes or initiates many of its offensive possessions with a Parker-Duncan pick and roll, and generates opportunities for other players off defensive attention to this action.
Along with the high pick and roll, San Antonio uses a variety of sets to put Parker in position to score.
Here is the end result of a drag-screen/pin down play the Spurs often run. Parker, a 47.2 percent mid-range shooter, is wide open for the jumper, but also has an open lane towards the middle of the key as his man recovers from the baseline. If Pau Gasol steps down to help, Tim Duncan, a 43.3 percent mid-range shooter, will be wide open. If Dwight Howard steps up to cut off Parker, a Tiago Splitter will likely have an open dunk as Parker’s defender chases Parker. On this play, Parker takes and makes the mid-range jumper, but could have easily scored off the drive. Parker’s touch around the rim, as well as the ability to find open looks in the paint based off his speed and hesitation moves make him one of the best finishing guards in the league, evidenced by a 67.8 percent field goal percentage in the restricted area.
Here, Dwight Howard covers the pick and roll the same way Andrew Bogut is expected to. He drops into the paint, denying the drive, but leaving parker open for a mid-range jumper. This is a better result for the Lakers than an open driving lane would be, but just as Ty Lawson did in the first round, Parker will be able to convert a high rate of these open opportunities.
Parker’s main flaw is his inconsistent shooting from behind the arc. This season, he has made 37 percent of his left corner threes, an impressive 47.6 percent of his right corner threes, and only 21.1 percent of his above the break attempts. Perhaps more telling are Parker’s limited attempts. He has only taken 68 three-point shots this season. Of course, leaving Parker open for jump shots is simply not a good strategy. Though Synergy ranks him as the league’s 132nd best spot-up shooter, he still scores 1.01 points per play off these looks, a respectable points per-play (not to be confused with per possession: per possession factors in scoring opportunities off offensive rebounds, so per possession statistics for offenses will always show a higher offensive rating than per play) of 1.01.
The method for slowing Tony Parker has been in development since mid-season game against the Spurs, when, suffering from a fortunate bout of creative coaching, Mark Jackson started Klay Thompson on Tony Parker. Though he lacks the speed of top defenders like the recently-overcome Andre Iguodala, Thompson’s size length allow him to disrupt point guards throughout possessions by forcing them to create more space for passing and driving lanes, and open shots. In the first round, Mark Jackson showed a clear willingness to cross-match Thompson on to the quicker Ty Lawson, but did not fully commit to the strategy, as it often forced Stephen Curry to guard Andre Iguodala. With Brewer in the game, the Warriors were generally able to switch without repercussions, but did not always take advantage of the opportunity.
Here, Ty Lawson cannot get around Thompson as he comes off the screen, and is pulls up for the three. Thompson is long enough to contest the shot after sagging a couple feet off of Lawson to prevent the drive.
Against San Antonio, the Warriors should have an easier time switching Thompson on to Parker. Stephen Curry will be able to guard Danny Green for many minutes, without fearing foul trouble, or giving up a significant size advantage to a main offensive piece like he did against Iguodala.
If the Warriors are to have any hope of stopping Tony Parker and the Spurs’ offense, Andrew Bogut will have to consistently be as physically active and mobile as he was during his best stretches against Denver. Even if the series long exposure inspires Andre Iguodala level defense from Thompson, Tony Parker will find ways to the rim. Against Parker’s calculated rim attacks, Bogut, the last line of defense, must constantly be in position to deny scoring opportunities without forcing extra Warriors’ to rotate down defensively, forcing Parker to kick to the perimeter, not to open shooters, but as an outlet from a contested shot.
Draymond Green’s offensive play in the final games against Denver makes another intriguing option possible. So long is he is not too heavy a burden on the offense, Draymond Green may be the Warriors most effective pick and roll defending big man. Unlike Carl Landry and David Lee’s defense often suggest, the four-year college player already has a high-level understanding of pick and roll defense, and has the mobility to act upon this knowledge. Green saw more action as a perimeter defender than big man defender against Denver, but is one of the few Warriors who could effectively hedge and recover against Tony Parker off Tiago Splitter, Boris Diaw, or even Tim Duncan, who would likely take advantage of Green in the post.
The Warriors best option may simply be to force Parker to score and avoid compromising their rotations. Parker scored efficiently against the Lakers in the first round, but by overcompensating, the Lakers played right into the Spurs desires. San Antonio has put together a roster of shooters capable of taking advantage of any significant opening, and big men who can score in several situations. When defenses focus their attention on Parker, they open many more scoring opportunities for San Antonio’s vaunted offense.
