Could The Warriors Have Beaten The Memphis Grizzlies?

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Monday night, the San Antonio Spurs completed a sweep of the Memphis Grizzlies, securing a spot in the finals and leaving Memphis to join the 26 other teams watching the conference finals on TV.  Though Games 2 and 3 were decided in overtime, the Spurs appeared to be in control throughout the series.  San Antonio dispatched the Golden State Warriors in the second round, but appeared to struggle in the process, losing two games and overcoming a double-digit deficit in the fourth quarter of another.

San Antonio scored 104.4 points per 100 possessions to the Warriors in their second round series, and allowed 99.7, per nba.com.  In the four games versus Memphis, the Spurs scored 105.3 points per 100 possessions, and allowed 93.4.   During the regular season, the Grizzlies allowed only 100.3 points per 100 possessions, second only to the Indiana Pacers, and scored 104.9.  As was expected, Memphis affected San Antonio’s offensive production.  Memphis had been scoring at a top ten rate after the Rudy Gay trade, and likely needed to maintain at least average offensive production to beat San Antonio.  Instead, San Antonio held Memphis to an offensive rating 6.8 points per 100 possessions worse than the league-worst Washington Wizards’ season production.

Despite the drastic difference in performance versus San Antonio, the Warriors’ success relative to Memphis should not be perceived as superiority.  Though teams work to become versatile, performance in the NBA is often dictated by match-ups, and the Spurs are better equipped to overcome Memphis’ strengths and take advantage of their weaknesses than the Warriors.

Led by Zach Randolph and Marc Gasol, Memphis finished 15.7% of their offensive possessions with a post up, according to mysynergysports.com.  The post-up itself is not a very efficient offensive weapon.  The 8th ranked Grizzlies scored 0.86 points per play off post ups and 0.9 points per play overall.  However posting up, especially if it forces the defense to double team, as Randolph and Gasol often do, forces defenses to adjust, drawing help defenders, forcing rotations, and opening other opportunities for the offense.

The removal of David Lee skews the data, but the Warriors allowed 0.85 points per play to post ups this season, 19th in the league.  Andrew Bogut, as he showed against Tim Duncan, is a very good post defender, but the other Warriors defenders lack the size, strength, mobility, or defensive intelligence to be effective versus Randolph and Gasol.  San Antonio, conversely, allowed only 0.76 points per play to post ups, best in the league.

The more significant difference is between the two teams help strategies against post ups.

Here, the Warriors allow San Antonio to make a clean inbounds pass, leaving Tim Duncan isolated in the post against Carl Landry.  Only after Duncan has established deep post position, Klay Thompson leaves Manu Ginobili at the top of the key to help on Duncan.  Thompson’s help defense is not aggressive enough to affect Duncan’s move, but leaves Manu Ginobili wide open for three one pass from the ball.   The Grizzlies spot-up shooters are far less of a concern than San Antonio’s, making this defense still unacceptable defense less damaging. Even against Memphis, surrendering decent spot up opportunities is poor defense.  Though they ranked 28th in the league in spot up points play, the 0.9 points per play scored by Memphis of spot ups is equally efficient to their overall offense and more efficient than a post up field goal attempt.

Tiago Splitter and Tim Duncan give San Antonio the ability to defend post-ups without double-teaming.  Also, San Antonio’s pre-post up defense is generally more effective than the Warriors.  The Spurs’ wing defenders, especially Kawhi Leonard, are very good at harassing in bounds passers and helping on to posting big men prior to an entry pass.  Entry passes are made even more difficult by San Antonio’s commitment to fronting the post.

At 31 percent, the Grizzlies have the second highest offensive rebound percentage in the league. Memphis has the league’s 3rd least efficient offense off offensive rebounds, scoring 1.01 points per play according to mysynergysports.com.  But as with spot ups, Memphis’ inefficiency relative to the rest of the league does not mean plays ending in a shot off an offensive rebound are inefficient relative to Memphis’ own offense.  Of the categories tracked by Synergy, offensive rebounds is the third most efficient source of offense for the Grizzlies, trailing only cut and transition opportunities.

With David Lee off the court, the Warriors allowed a 58.6 percent offensive rebound percentage to shots by the opponent generated off offensive rebounds, compared to only 43.9 percent off a made field goal or free throw (To clarify: after the Warriors made a field goal or free throw, the Warriors allowed their opponents to shoot 43.9 percent adjusted field goal percentage) and 46.8 percent off a defensive rebound (meaning after the Warriors missed a field goal or free throw attempt, and the Warriors’ opponent rebounded, the Warriors opponent shot a 46.8 percent adjusted field goal percentage), according to nbawowy.com.  The Spurs allowed only 51.0 percent effective field goal percentage shooting after offensive rebounds.

Given the limited sample size of the Warriors’ without David Lee and with a healthy Andrew Bogut, it is difficult to predict the results of a hypothetical Memphis-Golden State series.  Perhaps the injuries to Stephen Curry and Andrew Bogut that affected their performance versus San Antonio may not have occurred, but given the injury history of those two players, that cannot be guaranteed.

Mike Conley and Tony Allen are elite on ball perimeter defenders and a threat to the Warriors hypothetical offensive production.  However, despite his on-ball prowess, Allen is not a consistent off ball defender, often straying off his man in misguided attempts to wreak havoc on opposing offenses.  Had Lionel Hollins chosen to defend Stephen Curry with Tony Allen, the Warriors use of Curry off the ball may have had more success than it did against the Spurs.  However, had Curry not injured his ankle he may never have shifted into this off ball role, in which case Allen and Conley may have drastically decreased his offensive efficiency.

While the Warriors would not be guaranteed a loss versus the Grizzlies, they would not be able to target Memphis’ weaknesses and limit their strengths as effectively as the Spurs.

Can Klay Thompson Develop As A Scorer?

In what fans hope soon becomes a less rare occasion, the Golden State Warriors are not going to spend their offseason scouting potential lottery picks.  The refreshing lack of draft picks does not remove the doubts of the typical off-season.  Though the players were already on the roster, the principle remains the same: the Warriors are hoping that their young players, Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, Harrison Barnes, Draymond Green, Festus Ezeli, and even Kent Bazemore are able to improve.

 

Klay Thompson’s recently addressed defensive improvements salvaged a frustrating offensive season.  In a pre-season ESPN poll surveying 30 league officials, Klay Thompson was voted “most likely to breakout,” and though his defense was a revelation, this almost certainly predicted an offensive explosion.  Instead, Thompson was inconsistent; sometimes brilliant, sometimes depressing, and nearly always confusing.

 

Thompson clearly has offensive skills.  At 1.26 points per play, he ranked 16th in points per play in spot up situations according to mysynergysports.com, despite a shot selection likely poorer than comparable shooters.

 

Most of Thompson’s offensive game is built around his shooting ability.  He is always a threat spotting up, often in transition.  As the his offensive role expanded, Thompson became the beneficiary of many of the Warriors’ off-ball actions.  He is Stephen Curry’s partner in many of the Warriors cross screen sets and runs countless pin-downs per game.

 

 

As he established himself as a scoring threat off these pin-down style plays, further offensive opportunities emerged.  Defenders often overplay to deny the jump shot, allowing Thompson to get into the lane.  Though his 55.3 percent field goal percentage within five feet of the rim is slightly below average, that amounts to 1.106 points per shot, excluding free throws.  With free throw attempts included, the Warriors scored 1.085 points per shot this season.

 

Once Thompson became a threat to drive off overplays, defensive big men began stepping into his driving lane, allowing him to pass down to the offensive big man rolling off the screen.  As the season progressed, Thompson improved at reading the defense in these situations.

 

With improved shot selection and more consistent footwork, Thompson can become a very effective offensive player on the already established base of his shooting ability, but can he improve beyond that point?  As Kawhi Leonard so eagerly displayed, good defenders can take away much of Thompson’s efficient option.

Picture 2

Many of Klay Thompson’s inefficiencies are generated by struggles around the rim.  He can get by his man, but does not have the explosion to beat the rotating big men to the rim.  Thompson is forced into taking many layups from beyond his limited comfort zone.  An improved finishing ability would obviously make Thompson a more potent scorer.  He blows several transition opportunities per game, both from a fear of driving and an inability to convert when he does drive.  Thompson’s fear of contact at the rim should draw no comparisons to the problem that once haunted Derrick Rose.  While Rose contorted his body to avoid contact and finish the layup, Thompson consistently jumps to early or at awkward angles in trying to simply get a shot off.  As he becomes more comfortable with NBA defense, Thompson may be able to draw fouls at a rate higher than the 0.11 free throws per field goal attempt he drew this season.

 

Towards the end of the season, Thompson revealed another aspect to his offensive game.  Often off 1-2 pick and rolls, he began posting up defenders, usually in the mid-post below the elbow.

 

 

Thompson often takes the fade-away, but is also able to get defenders off balance and drive into the lane, opening up kick-outs to shooters and dump off passes to big men. Several of the actions Thompson already runs would allow him to take advantage of a more developed post offense.   Misdirections and seals can be incorporated into many of the Warriors’ sets.  The baseline runner in the flex-style offense shown in the video above has many opportunities for deep post position.

 

 

The Warriors’ corner sets offer another opportunity to create post touches for Thompson.  At 0:56, Thompson stops his cut below the basket instead of continuing to the perimeter, allowing him to seal off Manu Ginobli for an easy layup.

 

The greatest impediment to Thompson becoming a consistent scorer is his dribbling ability.  For many players, dribbling is one of the most difficult skills to improve. Thompson will likely never have the control or creativity to be an effective off the dribble scorer, but developing a steady handle will open many more opportunities.

 

According to mysynergysports.com, Thompson finished 7.5 percent of his plays as a pick and roll ball handler, very low for a high-usage guard, and was very inefficient in these situations, scoring only 0.57 points per play.  Better dribbling and more consistent footwork when shooting off the dribble will allow Thompson to use the pick and roll as a secondary option after several off-ball sets.

 

 

With an improved handle, Thompson’s already established off-ball prowess will increase the Warriors offensive options.  Sets similar to the Denver Nuggets single down imitate the pin-down the Warriors typically run to open Thompson for a mid-range jumper, but are designed to give the offensive player a lane through the middle of the court.  By adding wrinkles to his own game, Thompson allows the Warriors to diversify their offense and put Thompson in better scoring position.

 

 

Teams like the San Antonio Spurs and Indiana Pacers often have wing players cut across big men in the high post for handoffs.  Players like Paul George are given lanes to the basket, as the high-post big man’s defender is likely out of position to pick up a drive as he defends his man.  When defenders go under the screen, the cutter is generally given an open jump shot.  With improvements to his dribbling and finishing, Klay Thompson could be very effective in similar situations.

 

Klay Thompson needs only to make minor improvements to become an efficient scorer in his current role.  Improvements beyond shot selection and minor footwork will be needed for him to become the diverse wing scorer the Warriors currently lack.

Will Harrison Barnes Develop Behind Curry and Thompson?

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

With their recent success and wealth of young talent, the Warriors are considered a team on the rise.  But despite Curry’s star-power, how far they rise may be dictated by the development of Harrison Barnes.  Barnes, the karmic reward for Charles Jenkins’ 2011-2012 late season heroics, David Lee’s “unfortunate” injury, and most definitely not shameless, calculated, and committed tanking, has the highest ceiling of any non-Curry player on the roster.

 

 

Though he may not realize it, Harrison Barnes is extremely athletic, as Nikola Pekovic can confirm.  While his athleticism may be his greatest asset, Barnes rarely appears to be fully engaging his athletic ability.  Offensively, he will often resort to his nonchalant, rehearsed, and entirely inefficient mid-range jumper over a drive to the rim.  Barnes’ lack of aggression with the ball is further accented off the ball.  He tends to disappear for lengthy stretches, and rarely actively puts himself in position to affect the game.

 

Barnes’ general lack of aggression is not inexcusable.  While his playoff performance may suggest otherwise, Barnes was often the fourth or fifth scoring option for the Warriors, and rarely was required to create offensively.  However, to maximize both his and the Warriors’ potential, Barnes will likely need to expand his role offensively, and develop the skills that allow him to do so.

 

The problem facing the Warriors, a problem they likely do not mind having, is that established young talent already occupies much of the role Barnes may seek to grow into. Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson appear set to be the Warriors’ primary offensive weapons for years to come, barring any core changing trade.  Barnes’ offensive attack would likely be different from Thompson or Curry’s.  Offensively, the ideal Barnes repeatedly attacks the rim, taking advantage of his athleticism and finishing ability, and draws help defenders, opening Thompson and Curry.

 

Barnes’ ability to fulfill this role is limited by his currently no better than mediocre dribbling ability.  Barnes often appears very rigid when moving on the court.  He is a capable dribbler, but lacking the ability to quickly react to his defenders movements, he is restricted to committing to a move or destination and picking up or clearing out if he cannot beat his man.

 

Klay Thompson suffers from the same dribbling deficiencies as Barnes.  Both players’ potential can only be maximized if they develop their dribbling ability, and both will likely spend countless hours attempting to improve their handle during the offseason.  The potential impact of this practice is unknown, and the Warriors may struggle to find sufficient in game situations for each player to develop their abilities.  Now that they expect to contend for a playoff spot, the Warriors will likely not be able to dedicate regular season possessions to Barnes and Thompson’s development.  Though Jarrett Jack may think otherwise, the Warriors are at their best offensively with the ball in Curry’s hand, and the margin for error next season may be smaller than Warriors’ fans expect.

 

It is difficult to predict Thompson and Curry’s impact on Barnes’ development.  While they may limit his growth, Barnes could also have an experience similar to Kawhi Leonard in San Antonio. With Curry and Thompson as an offensive safety net, Barnes may be able to expand his game without being immediately relied upon to support the team, and can refine his dribbling skills without having to compromise his development for immediate team performance.

 

The development of Harrison Barnes, Klay Thompson, and the Warriors’ young core is expected, but for the Warriors to approach a high level of contention a core similar to the current one, several players will have to make drastic improvements.

Where Does Klay Thompson Rank Among The League’s Top Shooting Guards?

(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

Improved defense and a few offensive outbursts cemented Klay Thompson as a key piece to the Warriors’ future.  With his national recognition on the rise, where does Thompson rank among the league’s top shooting guards?

Tier 1:

1.         Dwyane Wade:  Wade, James Harden, and Kobe Bryant, or some iteration of the three, are widely considered the only stars at shooting guard.  Wade’s defense is the decisive factor in creating the slight separation between Wade, Harden, and Bryant.  While Wade is not always dedicated defensively, he positively affects Miami at that end far more often than Harden and Bryant do their teams.  Harden and Bryant have very little interest in on ball defense, and can often be found drifting off their man, floating on defense without purpose.  While his effort can be criticized, he is more consistent defensively than either Harden or Bryant, and has a greater impact at maximum effort as well.  Though Wade benefits from playing with LeBron James, his offensive efficiency may be equally valuable to the slightly less efficient creation of Harden and Bryant.

 

2.         James Harden:  Often called the future of the shooting guard position, James Harden is already the present.  At only 24 years old, Harden is one of the best offensive players in the league.  Though he can score from anywhere on the court, Harden generally restricts his shot selection to only the most efficient areas, behind the arc and at the rim.  The Houston Rockets have built their entire offense around him in the pick and roll.  Along with being an incredible scorer, Harden is one of the best passers in the league, and repeatedly finds teammates for open threes as defenses collapse on his drives.  At 50.4 percent, Harden and Bryant have the exact same adjusted field goal percentage.  What separates Harden from Bryant, and most of the league, is his ability to draw fouls.  Harden’s true shooting percentage, which includes free throws, is 60 percent, incredible for a guard, while Bryant’s is slightly less efficient 57 percent.

 

3.         Kobe Bryant:  Though Bryant’s season may be remembered for his Achilles’ injury, his offensive performance this season was very impressive.  Fighting old age, injuries, roster instability, coaching change, and possibly Dwight Howard, Kobe finished with his highest true-shooting percentage since the 2007-2008 season, and the highest assist percentage of his career.  Though his defense was often crippling, his offense was brilliant.  With him on the court, the Lakers scored 110.4 points per 100 possessions.  Bryant is often criticized for his supposed “selfishness,” but had a higher assist percentage than James Harden, who rarely suffers the same criticisms.

 

Tier 2:

4.         Andre Iguodala:       Iguodala played small forward for most of his career, but transitioned to a shooting guard role for Denver (one of the few intricacies of player analysis actually covered in these rankings).  Iguodala is decent offensively.  He creates opportunities for his teammates, but does not always convert ones he creates for himself, and has a high turnover rate.  Iguodala has his moments offensively, and is consistently great defensively.  He defends the opponents best perimeter player, from LeBron James to Steph Curry, and produces among the best defensive results in the league.

 

Tier 3:

Here it gets a bit (a lot) more convoluted.  Potential disrupts the perception of current ability, but potential should also affect current value.  For an older player, performance over the duration of a season outweighs a strong finish, while for younger players, a strong finish could be a sign of long-lasting improvement.  Players like Klay Thompson, Bradley Beal, and Jimmy Butler all made dramatic improvements by the end of the season, but players like Arron Afflalo, Joe Johnson, and J.J. Redick may have been better over the duration of the season.

 

At least at this moment, this third tier consists of the Joe Johnson, the oft-injured Eric Gordon, Arron Afflalo, J.J. Redick, Bradley Beal, Jimmy Butler, Klay Thompson, and Manu Ginobli.  Beal, Butler, and Thompson all finished the season at a high level, Afflalo and Redick were consistently above average for mediocre to bad teams, Johnson was consistently above average for an above average team, Gordon was consistently not playing for a team, and Ginobli was inconsistently excellent for a great team.  All of these players have flaws, but all are, or at least  by the end of the season appeared to be, a positive factor for their team.

 

Tier 4: 

Now we reach the depths of even greater convolution, where potential and production vary from game to game. Here the flaws are more fatal,  the potential is less likely to result in production, or the ceiling of production is lower.  This tier includes Avery Bradley, Lance Stephenson, Tyreke Evans, Demar Derozan, Kevin Martin, Iman Shumpert, Danny Green, Tony Allen, Wesley Matthews, Warriors’ acquaintance Monta Ellis, and others.

 

As a disclaimer, these tiers and rankings do not indicate a finite judgement of these players boundaries and abilities.  Finding Klay Thompson’s place relative to his peers helps improve perspective on Thompson’s value to the Warriors, his progress and current abilities, and his future.

 

Thompson has an elite skill, separating him from many of the other shooting guards in the league.  His inappropriate use of this skill is what limits him. Thompson likely lacks the athleticism to ever reach the Wade-Harden-Kobe plateau, but by improving his shot selection, Thompson can become a consistently dangerous offensive threat.  Thompson’s ability to shoot not just out of spot up but off screens allows him to create for teammates in atypical ways.  Dump downs to big men and kick outs to wings off drives stemming from defenses overplaying the jump shot are as important to Thompson’s offensive value as his scoring.

 

Thompson needs to improve his decision making and general offensive awareness, along with his dribbling, if he ever wants to become an offensive star, but his shooting ability and defense will make him a very good shooting guard with only minimal improvements.

Should The Warriors Trade Klay Thompson?

Around the trade deadline, rumors of a potential Klay Thompson for Eric Gordon trade surfaced.  A particularly astute observer may realize that this trade never came to fruition.  However, the concept of a Klay Thompson trade has not been entirely eliminated.  Though they may appear set for the future, the Warriors are a team in flux.  With Jarrett Jack and Carl Landry’s possible departures looming, next year’s roster may be dramatically different from the one that challenged San Antonio in the second round.

 

By the 2014-2015 season, several of the Warriors’ major contracts expire, giving the Warriors the flexibility for several major moves.  Stephen Curry appears to be a star worth building around, and the Warriors must determine if the current core sets the team up for success better than another attainable option.

 

Klay Thompson’s playoff performance demonstrated many of his basic merits and flaws.  He played excellent defense on several wings as well as Ty Lawson and Tony Parker, and won the Warriors a few games with hot shooting.  However, in between the performances that have inspired national praise, Thompson is inconsistent at best, and was easily defended by Kawhi Leonard.  Though being shut down by a defender of Leonard’s caliber is no great shame for a developing player, Thompson did not display any of the skills necessary to contribute offensively when he can not get open for his own shots.

 

That adjective, “developing” is the reason why Thompson’s future is so uncertain.  Had he already reached his ceiling, he would be an entirely expendable piece, but the potential for Thompson to improve his dribbling ability, defense, finishing, shot selection, passing, and general basketball awareness make a trade for equal value difficult to justify.  For Thompson, the areas needing improvement constitute a majority of a basketball players’ function, but the potential for any significant improvement in any of these categories, combined with several of Thompson’s already above-average skills, renders Thompson as more than just another quality young player.

 

A Thompson trade would most likely target a player similar to Eric Gordon, though there are several other possibilities.  The Warriors may believe that the lack of an off the dribble penetrator limits the team’s success.  While Thompson is able to get into the lane, usually as defenders overplay his jump shot, he lacks the explosion and handle to consistently penetrate from the wing.  Even when Thompson gets into the lane, he is not consistently productive.  Thompsons’ penchant for creatively, misguidedly, and consistently missing layups is one of his biggest flaws.  Be it a jump from one side of the hoop to attempt a Carly Landry-esque reverse layup on the other, or a jump away from the defender while trying to toss up the layup across the body, “Klayups” are one of the many consistently entertaining aspects of Warriors basketball.  This season, Klay Thompson shot 51.06 percent in the restricted area, slightly below league average, and was dreadful from slightly farther out.

Picture 1

Targeting a dribble penetrator is a simple enough idea, but as Thompson’s layups so often remind the unsuspecting viewer, even the simplest tasks can be difficult.  Despite what the preceding paragraph may suggest, young players on rookie contracts have an inherently high value in the NBA.  The modern dedication to floor spacing gives Thompson and his ability to function as a “three and D” type player an important role in the league regardless of potential improvements.

 

Given Thompson’s relatively impressive playoff performance any Thompson trade will likely bring back a potential or actual all-star.  Even if the Warriors believe that a dribble penetrator more consistent than Stephen Curry is necessary a trade may not be necessary.  Harrison Barnes, especially towards the end of the season, flashed potential as a secondary ball handler.  Barnes has the speed and athleticism to get to the rim and finish when he gets there, and along with Thompson, is expected to improve dramatically as he gains experience.

 

The Warriors would be unwise to completely ignore all Thompson trade offers, but openly shopping Thompson when the market has little of attainable equivalent value to offer is not a more desirable alternative.  Klay Thompson has several flaws, but also has a very attainable potential to become a high-level player.  Trading David Lee may be a path worth exploring, but Lee’s value, both on the market and to the Warriors, is a topic worthy of another article.

Stephen Curry: How Can He Get Back On Track?

Stephen Curry’s hot hand may be limited to the court, but over the last month he has set the basketball world on fire.  After suffering through the Curry experience in Game 1, the Spurs began experimenting new defensive strategies to be used on Curry.  Amid the cries of “top five point guard!” and “best shooter ever!” Gregg Popovich was focused on slowing the newly anointed star.

 

Though likely helped by an ankle injury, the Spurs have greatly limited Curry since Game 2.  In three games since the Game 2 victory in San Antonio, Stephen Curry has a true shooting percentage of only 47.9 percent, far below of 58.9 percent true shooting during the regular season and 57.1 percent for the playoffs.  These struggles have not simply been a matter of scoring efficiency.  Curry’s assist percentage (percent of teammates field goals assisted while on court) has dropped from his regular season 31.1 percent to 24.1 percent, and his usage rate has dropped from 26.4 percent to 22.6 percent.  Along with dramatically limiting his efficiency, the Spurs have pressured Curry out of his typical rate of creation.

 

In Game 1 Tony Parker was Stephen Curry’s primary defender.  Since then, Curry has primarily faced Danny Green, with intermittent spurts versus Tony Parker and Kawhi Leonard.  Tony Parker is a match-up liability versus the Warriors’ large wings, but the Spurs are clearly willing to surrender this in exchange for the ability to keep Green consistently matched up with Curry.

 

In his second year in San Antonio, Danny Green has developed into a very good perimeter defender.  Warriors fans may recognize his ability to use his length to his advantage after recently admiring Klay Thompson’s defense.  Green also has the strength, quickness, defensive instincts, and understanding of help-schemes to be a very good defender both on and off the ball.

 

Green’s willingness to pick up James Harden so far from the basket does not suggest he would ever give Curry the space to take an uncontested jump shot, as Harden is a far greater threat to attack the rim than Curry.

 

Green will not willingly surrender an inch of space on the perimeter, and in the pick and roll, the Spurs big men have been more committed to hedging and trapping Curry since Game 2.

 

Green, assisted by Curry’s shift to an off ball role, has done very well in limiting Curry’s space and denying any shooting opportunities.  Over the course of the series, Curry has shifted towards an off-ball role.  This off-ball role in Game 4 may have been induced by an ankle injury at the end of Game 3, but Curry’s shift began before Game 4, and continued through Game 5, when Curry appeared less hampered by ankle troubles.  This shift to an off-ball role may be due to a belief that Curry puts more pressure on the defense running through off-ball screens, or that Curry needs the structured spacing of these plays to find scoring opportunities, but regardless of the Warriors’ motivation, Danny Green, along with the entire Spurs defense, has been excellent in preventing Curry from performing well offensively in this role.

 

To get Curry “going” again, the Warriors can wait for some miracle shooting, or proactively create beneficial offensive opportunities.  They have attempted to free Curry for jump shots through off-ball action, but the disciplined Spurs have allowed very little space to Curry, often hedging or not-so-accidentally bumping Curry as he runs through off-ball screens.  Athletic defenders like Danny Green and Kawhi Leonard are able to chase Curry through these patterns without losing any significant ground.

 

Throughout the seasons, Curry’s primary method of on-ball attack was the pick and roll.  32.2 percent of Curry’s shot attempts, drawn fouls, or turnovers were generated through the pick and roll, far more than any other category tracked by mysynergysports.com.  The Warriors recognize Curry’s proficiency in the pick and roll, and have developed a complex offense around the pick and roll.

 

Curry’s pick and roll are generally initiated from to locations, the top of key above the three-point line, or slightly above the break.  Against top of the key pick and rolls, the Spurs big men generally stay in the paint, leaving Curry open for mid-range jump shots.  Possibly because the athleticism of Green and Leonard makes these shots more difficult, Curry has been less aggressive off top of the key pick and rolls.  He made his way into the paint off several at the beginning of Game 5, but went away from this action as the game progressed.

 

With the Warriors seemingly committed to using Curry off-ball, especially when Jarrett Jack is playing, many of Curry’s recent pick and rolls have been initiated towards the wing.  Curry generally finishes off-ball plays in the corner or near the break, and drifts towards the wing.  As the primary ball-handler, Curry will often dribble to this spot to set up the pick and roll.

 

Throughout the season, the Warriors ran these “Hawk Angle” pick and rolls.  This action is generally preceded by a cutter running through the lane.

 

Against San Antonio, the Warriors have been reluctant to send this cutter when running hawk-angle pick and rolls.

 

 

In this play, Klay Thompson sets the screen for Curry, and rolls towards the right corner.  The Warriors spacing on this play allows Boris Diaw to defend and box out both Landry and Lee, leaving Tim Duncan free to cover any penetration, meaning Kawhi Leonard can hedge aggressively deny the jump shot before recovering to Thompson.

 

The goal of this pick and roll may just be to draw a Parker switch onto Thompson, but the Warriors have run the hawk-angle pick and roll without sending the cutter regardless of the screener during this series.  Even if Klay Thompson were on the opposite wing and David Lee was setting the screen, the  Spurs’ help defenders would be able to free Duncan by having the man in the corner step down to fill Duncan’s rotation, only punishable by an extremely difficult kick pass by Curry to the opposite corner only LeBron James has mastered.

 

 

 

On this iteration of the hawk angle pick and roll, Klay Thompson runs through the lane as Harrison Barnes comes to set the screen.  This forces the defense to account for Thompson running through the lane and coming off a screen on the opposite side, forcing Howard and Gasol to commit to help defense longer than expected, giving Curry more room to operate both in the middle of the court and on the right side.

 

Curry’s ankle injury may render any hope for Curry’s re-emergence as an offensive star a failure, but putting Curry in position to succeed is necessary if the Warriors hope to come back in the series.  Off-ball actions often devolve into simple isolations on the catch, and against the Spurs have rarely produced open looks.  Operating out of the pick and roll allows Curry to create or find his own space, and affects San Antonio’s defense much more than spot-ups and off-ball screens typically do.  Stephen Curry has become an elite offensive NBA player, and as any Knicks (or general NBA) viewer will confirm, putting an offensive talent in position to succeed involves more than simply getting them the ball.

The Blueprint for Slowing Down Tony Parker

NBA: Golden State Warriors at San Antonio Spurs

 

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

“Spurs basketball” has become synonymous with “efficiency”, and “playing to your strengths,” and, as much as even Tim Duncan, Tony Parker embodies San Antonio’s core values.  As control of the offense shifted from Tim Duncan to him, Parker has expanded his offensive game, but only within the boundaries of efficiency.  Though a late season ankle injury derailed his bid, Tony Parker was among the lower-ranking MVP candidates throughout the season.

Parker, along with most other Spurs, rarely attacks without advantage.  Of course, a player a skilled and quick as Parker finds himself able to create advantageous situations far more than most players.  According to Synergy, Parker ranks 14th in the league in isolation points per play, 24th off-screens, 15th in hand-off situations, 2nd on cuts, and 11th in the bread, butter, jam, plate, and accompanying glass of milk of his offense, the pick and roll.  The pick and roll comprises 46.2% of Parker’s offensive possessions, and is the main the central component of San Antonio’s offense.  San Antonio, which finished seventh in regular season offensive efficiency, either finishes or initiates many of its offensive possessions with a Parker-Duncan pick and roll, and generates opportunities for other players off defensive attention to this action.

Along with the high pick and roll, San Antonio uses a variety of sets to put Parker in position to score.

Here is the end result of a drag-screen/pin down play the Spurs often run.  Parker, a 47.2 percent mid-range shooter, is wide open for the jumper, but also has an open lane towards the middle of the key as his man recovers from the baseline.  If Pau Gasol steps down to help, Tim Duncan, a 43.3 percent mid-range shooter, will be wide open.  If Dwight Howard steps up to cut off Parker, a Tiago Splitter will likely have an open dunk as Parker’s defender chases Parker.  On this play, Parker takes and makes the mid-range jumper, but could have easily scored off the drive.  Parker’s touch around the rim, as well as the ability to find open looks in the paint based off his speed and hesitation moves make him one of the best finishing guards in the league, evidenced by a 67.8 percent field goal percentage in the restricted area.

Here, Dwight Howard covers the pick and roll the same way Andrew Bogut is expected to.  He drops into the paint, denying the drive, but leaving parker open for a mid-range jumper.  This is a better result for the Lakers than an open driving lane would be, but just as Ty Lawson did in the first round, Parker will be able to convert a high rate of these open opportunities.

Parker’s main flaw is his inconsistent shooting from behind the arc.  This season, he has made 37 percent of his left corner threes, an impressive 47.6 percent of his right corner threes, and only 21.1 percent of his above the break attempts.  Perhaps more telling are Parker’s limited attempts.  He has only taken 68 three-point shots this season.  Of course, leaving Parker open for jump shots is simply not a good strategy.  Though Synergy ranks him as the league’s 132nd best spot-up shooter, he still scores 1.01 points per play off these looks, a respectable points per-play (not to be confused with per possession: per possession factors in scoring opportunities off offensive rebounds, so per possession statistics for offenses will always show a higher offensive rating than per play) of 1.01.

The method for slowing Tony Parker has been in development since mid-season game against the Spurs, when, suffering from a fortunate bout of creative coaching, Mark Jackson started Klay Thompson on Tony Parker.  Though he lacks the speed of top defenders like the recently-overcome Andre Iguodala, Thompson’s size length allow him to disrupt point guards throughout possessions by forcing them to create more space for passing and driving lanes, and open shots.  In the first round, Mark Jackson showed a clear willingness to cross-match Thompson on to the quicker Ty Lawson, but did not fully commit to the strategy, as it often forced Stephen Curry to guard Andre Iguodala.  With Brewer in the game, the Warriors were generally able to switch without repercussions, but did not always take advantage of the opportunity.

Here, Ty Lawson cannot get around Thompson as he comes off the screen, and is pulls up for the three.  Thompson is long enough to contest the shot after sagging a couple feet off of Lawson to prevent the drive.

Against San Antonio, the Warriors should have an easier time switching Thompson on to Parker.  Stephen Curry will be able to guard Danny Green for many minutes, without fearing foul trouble, or giving up a significant size advantage to a main offensive piece like he did against Iguodala.

If the Warriors are to have any hope of stopping Tony Parker and the Spurs’ offense, Andrew Bogut will have to consistently be as physically active and mobile as he was during his best stretches against Denver.  Even if the series long exposure inspires Andre Iguodala level defense from Thompson, Tony Parker will find ways to the rim.  Against Parker’s calculated rim attacks, Bogut, the last line of defense, must constantly be in position to deny scoring opportunities without forcing extra Warriors’ to rotate down defensively, forcing Parker to kick to the perimeter, not to open shooters, but as an outlet from a contested shot.

Draymond Green’s offensive play in the final games against Denver makes another intriguing option possible.  So long is he is not too heavy a burden on the offense, Draymond Green may be the Warriors most effective pick and roll defending big man.  Unlike Carl Landry and David Lee’s defense often suggest, the four-year college player already has a high-level understanding of pick and roll defense, and has the mobility to act upon this knowledge.  Green saw more action as a perimeter defender than big man defender against Denver, but is one of the few Warriors who could effectively hedge and recover against Tony Parker off Tiago Splitter, Boris Diaw, or even Tim Duncan, who would likely take advantage of Green in the post.

The Warriors best option may simply be to force Parker to score and avoid compromising their rotations.   Parker scored efficiently against the Lakers in the first round, but by overcompensating, the Lakers played right into the Spurs desires.  San Antonio has put together a roster of shooters capable of taking advantage of any significant opening, and big men who can score in several situations.  When defenses focus their attention on Parker, they open many more scoring opportunities for San Antonio’s vaunted offense.

How Can the Warriors Slow Ty Lawson?

url-1

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Up two to one, with two more home games, the Warriors have to be feeling good.  But, they have one nagging problem: Ty Lawson.  Lawson struggled in game one, but has consistently abused the Warriors’ defense, setting up teammates and scoring himself.  In game 3, Lawson exploded for 35 points on 22 field goal attempts and 11 free throw attempts.

While Lawson has been effective in transition, and iso’d on several possessions, the majority of his offense has been generated through the pick and roll.  According to mysynergysports.com, Lawson ends 34.5 percent of his possessions as the pick and roll ball handler.  In these situations, Lawson scores 0.89 points per play, 23rd best in the league.  The Warriors had the league’s 13th best defense by points per play, but struggled to defend the pick and roll ball handler, allowing 0.83 points per play, 25th in the league.

The Warriors generally ice pick and rolls, especially when Bogut is involved.  This is a good strategy for slowing the ball handler while giving the big man time to recover to the roll man, but forces the big man to attempt to contain the ball handler before the guard can recover, and against the lightning-quick Ty Lawson, the Warriors have struggled.

Lawson Bogut ice 1

The Nuggets are often criticized for lacking a complex offense.  Their possessions often devolve into a simple high pick and roll with little organized off ball movement. But in the last two games against the Warriors, at least when Ty Lawson plays, this has been effective.  In games 2 and 3, the Nuggets have scored 124 and 128 points per 100 possessions with Lawson in the game.  The play shown above demonstrates many of the options the Nuggets have available out of the high pick and roll.

Jarrett Jack is supposed to prevent Lawson from using Kenneth Faried’s screen, but is too far from Faried, who simply moves to the other side of Jack.  In typical “ice” fashion, Bogut sags off the screen, hoping to prevent Lawson from getting to the basket, but because the screen was set so high, Bogut is forced to extend all the way to the elbow, far enough that Lawson has space to get by him.  With Jack hung up on the screen, there is several feet of space between Lawson and any Warriors defenders, leaving Lawson wide open for a mid-range jump shot.  Lawson shot 40.3 percent from mid-range this season, but since the all-star break, has made an incredible 52.4 percent of his mid range attempts, per to nba.com.

Lawson chooses to drive at the retreating Bogut, forcing Harrison Barnes to decide between cutting off the drive and staying on Wilson Chandler, a 41.3 percent three-point shooter.  Barnes hesitates for a moment, ample time for Lawson to burn Bogut and get the rim with only Stephen Curry to defend him.

Picture 2

This is Ty Lawson’s shot chart for the first three games.  Lawson has attempted 24 shots at the rim, and only 7 from mid-range.  Though many of his at the rim shots come from transition opportunities, the Warriors have done a poor job forcing Lawson into taking mid-range jump shots.  Though Lawson has shot a high percentage on these attempts recently, allowing him to get all the way to the basket draws help defenders, and compromises the Warriors far more than a hopefully semi-contested jump shot would.

Andrew Bogut is not yet mobile enough to contain Lawson beyond the free throw line, forcing the Warriors to find another method of defending one of the fastest players in the league.  In the last few months of the regular season, and sporadically throughout the series with the Nuggets, the Warriors have defended point guards with the 6’-7” Klay Thompson.  Like nearly every player in the league, Thompson is not quick enough to defend Lawson without help, but his size does allow him to be more effective in preventing Lawson from using screens and contesting pull up jump shots while remaining in position to deny the drive.

Klay Thompson may be able to slow Lawson, but defending any good scorer is a team effort.  As Zach Lowe detailed for Grantland, NBA defenses are almost always under-help.

Picture 1

With Wilson Chandler out of the picture just crossing half court, Harrison Barnes should position himself at the free throw line and at least a step closer to Lawson, directly in his driving lane.  Also, Andrew Bogut should step off Javale McGee and into the center of the line. Though he my fear another embarrassment at the hands of McGee, discouraging Lawson from penetrating should be the priority. In both this play and the play previously shown, Harrison Barnes should be much more aggressive with his help defense.  Helping “one pass away” is a generally flawed practice, but intelligent positioning that allows a defender to guard his man and affect the ball handler will be necessary in the Warriors efforts to defend Ty Lawson.

Grading Warriors Key Players in Game Two Victory

Denver Nuggets vs Golden State Warriors in Denver, Colorado.

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Here is a precursor to the types of grades you can expect after the Warriors’ game two victory in Denver.  For those of you unfamiliar with nba.com’s shot charts, green means good, and in this case, historically good.

photo

Prior to Tuesday’s game, Denver was 29-3 at home, including the game one victory over the Warriors.  Without David Lee, the Warriors would need an incredible performance to even the series.   The Warriors responded by shooting 64.6 percent from the field with a 73.4 percent adjusted field goal percentage.  Bitter graduates can blame grade inflation all they want, the Warriors earned these marks.

Stephen Curry:          A-

Though he scared Warriors fans, and likely all basketball fans, with an ankle injury in the third quarter, Curry’s creation was key to the Warriors’ victory.  Following a 1 for 6 start, Curry made 12 of his final 17 shot attempts.  The Nuggets seemed less aggressive in trapping curry out of pick and rolls, and Curry took advantage of the extra space.  Kenneth Faried returned from an ankle injury, and clearly had not recovered entirely.  He appeared far less laterally mobile than usual, and Curry took advantage of Fareid out of pick and rolls after struggling to do the same to Javale McGee, who played only 14 minutes, in the first game of the series.  Curry consistently made excellent decisions, recording 13 assists and only 1 turnover.  He scored 30 points on 23 shot attempts at a 65.2 percent true-shooting percentage, and only missed the A, and likely A+, because he struggled to keep Ty Lawson out of the lane, allowing Denver to keep the game close enough to stress the most paranoid Warriors fans until the final couple minutes.

Klay Thompson:  A+

Thompson scored 21 points on 95.5 percent true shooting.  If that’s not impressive enough, much of it was done while guarded by Andre Iguodala.  Klay made 5 of 6 three point attempts, many surprisingly open as Denver scrambled to defend Stephen Curry and Jarrett Jack in the pick and roll.

Jarrett Jack:     A

Replacing David Lee in the starting line-up, Jarrett Jack played 43 minutes, in which he scored efficiently and created for others.  Jack made 10 of his 15 field goal attempts, and consistently penetrated the Denver defense, opening opportunities for Thompson, Curry, and Harrison Barnes, and provided consistent offense pressure to compliment Curry and Thompson’s long-range barrage.

Harrison Barnes:       A+

In one of his most impressive games of the year, Harrison Barnes scored a career high 24 points on 9 of 14 shooting, and displayed the dynamic skills he sporadically flashed through the season.  “Be aggressive” is a sort of cure-all ointment in the NBA.  From inspired player speeches to facetious Gregg Popovich mid-game interviews, “be aggressive” is often repeated as the solution to any difficult, and while many players’ and teams’ issues are unrelated to their aggression, or lack thereof, in the case of Harrison Barnes, being aggressive may be the key.

In his first start at nominal power forward, Barnes repeatedly attacked the basket, took advantage of mismatches, and, key for a player often left open by helping Nuggets defenders, made open shots.  David Lee will play the vast majority of power forward minutes next season, but Barnes success, albeit against the small-forward sized Wilson Chandler, bodes well for future use of small ball lineups.

Andrew Bogut:          B-

Bogut played well defensively, and without Koufos or McGee consistently running the pick and roll, the Nuggets did little to expose his mobility issues.  Bogut was in foul trouble throughout the game, and only played 22 minutes, limiting his total impact, but the defensive performance was a positive sign for the Warriors inconsistent defense.

Bench:                        B+

Carl Landry and Draymond Green each played 18 minutes, and Festus Ezeli added 16.  The bench played effectively in its limited role, but Mark Jackson generally rode the success of the starting lineup.   Though the Nuggets appeared invincible on their home court, the biggest upset of the day may have been Draymond Green, a 20.9 percent shooter from beyond the arc, making semi-important three pointer.