Tag Archives: Golden State Warriors

Analyzing the Warriors Best Plays

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

While the Warriors’ offense often boiled down to a simple high pick and roll, they featured many complex set plays and reads to increase scoring efficiency.

The Warriors’ most distinct offensive play is the “Elevator”.  This play is generally initiated out of a Horns set.  Horns begins with two high posts and a player stationed in either corner.  The player intended to come through the double screen, generally Stephen Curry, typically starts the play at the wing.  The Warriors also developed a few misdirection variations of the elevator play.  In one version, Curry will begin with the ball at the top of the court and make a pass to the wing. He then runs towards the corner, typical of a horns set, but quickly reverses direction and cuts back up through the double screen.

While it appears to rely on a single outcome, the beauty of the elevator play is that if the initial action is well defended it flows directly into a basic horns set.  The Warriors will generally simply have the two big men who set the elevator screens run a double screen with the ball handler.

The emergence of Klay Thompson as an offensive weapon led to an increased reliance on the “Corners” set.  This constant motion offensive set leads into several screen and rolls, pin downs, and spot up jumpers.  Teams such as the Dallas Mavericks and, most consistently, the Minnesota Timberwolves rely on the Corner as the basis of their offensive system.  While the Warriors were not as committed, their use of this set increased as the year progressed and players became more comfortable with the reads and wrinkles.

The Corner set allows the Warriors to decrease their reliance on Curry as the offensive initiator but, with the pick and roll opportunities, does not limit his role as an on-ball scorer.

Against teams like the Miami Heat that aggressively hedge on and off-ball screens, this set opens opportunities for the Warriors’ excellent passers to find open layups and weak side spot ups for teammates, while more conservative defenses are susceptible to giving the Warriors a damaging extra step on pick and rolls.

The Warriors were often simplistic in their offensive approach.  Basic Flex sets consistently led to high pick and rolls and there was an unnecessary reliance on motionless post ups.  However, many of the wrinkles that were added were very effective in leveraging the Warriors’ significant offensive talents.  As this core gains more experience after an injury-interrupted year, expect an increase in the complexity and effectiveness of many of the Warriors’ sets, as well as the addition of further plays.

San Antonio’s Excellence: A Lesson For The Warriors

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

In Game 3 of the NBA Finals, the San Antonio Spurs made a Finals record 16 three pointers en route to the third largest victory in Finals history.  Other factors contributed to the victory but it was the three point shooting, led by Danny Green, 7-for-9, and Gary Neal, 6-fo-10, that blew open the game.

The 16-of-32 three point shooting is incredible but more significant is the ease with which San Antonio found open three point opportunities.

The Spurs understand Miami’s defensive system and are able to take advantage of its flaws.  Here is an example indicative of a common breakdown in the Miami defense.

This is a variation on the “Loop” set San Antonio often runs.  After passing to Manu Ginobili at the top of the court, Tony Parker runs through a series of screens, curls towards the ball, and receives a pass from Ginobili.  San Antonio knows that Miami is a very aggressive pick and roll trapping team.  The loop often flows directly into a pick and roll with the last screener serving as the roll man after Parker makes the catch.

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On this play, Duncan expects Chris Bosh to trap Parker off his screen and immediately drops into post-position.  Parker makes a nice pass into Tim Duncan, getting him the ball before Bosh is able to recover.  This forces LeBron James to switch off Kawhi Leonard to guard Tim Duncan, leaving Dwyane Wade to defend Leonard.

Leonard instantly recognizes that Miami has overloaded the strong side and moves to basket, forcing Wade to stay tightly on him.  This leaves Mike Miller to defend both Ginobili, his original man, and Danny Green, now in the corner. Duncan, and excellent passer, finds Ginobili, who swings the ball to Green for a wide-open corner three.

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San Antonio uses a clever misdirection to further take advantage of Miami’s defense.  On a typical Loop set, Green would be positioned in the left corner.  At the beginning of the play, he appears to be headed to this spot but stops at the post area near Tim Duncan.  Green than fakes as if he were setting a screen, another common variation of the Loop, but cuts back and runs to the opposite corner.

Thought this shot was missed, San Antonio was able to find open opportunities out of similar sets designed to take advantage of Miami’s pick and roll traps.

So, what does this have to do with the Warriors?

To achieve future success, the Warriors will have to consistently overcome defenses geared to stop them.  Like San Antonio has done to Miami, the Warriors must be able to acknowledge and take advantage of defensive tendencies, a test in both innovation and execution.

How Can The Warriors’ Front Court Improve In 2013-2014?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

Carl Landry is expected to leave as a free agent this summer.  Despite this, the Warriors’ frontcourt should be able to improve going into next season, complimenting an already elite backcourt.

The easiest route to a superior frontcourt comes through internal improvements. Improved health from Andrew Bogut could give him increased mobility and comfort in the offense, potentially improving the Warriors both offensively and defensively.  Festus Ezeli, Bogut’s back up, was a rookie in the 2012-13 season and should improve naturally as he increases his understanding of NBA rotations and positioning.  Ezeli’s offensive game was close to non-existent this season, mostly due to an inability to catch less-than-perfect pass, especially when on the move.  If Ezeli’s “hands” improve, he may become more of a threat to finish pick and rolls, secure offensive rebounds, and take advantage of opportunities when opposing big men abandon him to play help defense.

At power-forward, Draymond Green showed promise during the Warriors’ playoff run.  Green is already a very good defender and has potential as a stretch four offensively.  He shot only 20.9 percent from three in his first year but improved to 39.1 percent during the playoffs.  Even as a poor shooter, Green’s position on the perimeter forces defenders to a few steps further out of the paint that David Lee typically would offensively.  Though inconsistent, Green often shows good court vision and was a very good rebounder in college.  He finished the season with an assist percentage of only 7.0 percent and a total rebound percentage of 13.5 percent (many of his minutes came at small forward, affecting rebounding numbers) but has the fundamentals and physical abilities to be an above average rebounder.  Any offensive improvement from Green would be a welcome addition to his already excellent defense and could greatly improve the Warriors’ frontcourt.

Harrison Barnes, like fellow rookie Green, had success playing power-forward during the playoffs.  Though it is unlikely that the Warriors rely on Barnes as a full-time power-forward, stretches of small ball could help the Warriors replicate their playoff success.  At power-forward, Barnes is able to attack slower players from the perimeter and has fewer defensive big men to account for at the rim. Many power-forwards are not accustomed to defending players on the perimeter, giving Barnes, a 35.9 percent three point shooter, open opportunities. Even when opponents add a perimeter player to match the Warriors, defensive help schemes often force opponents to leave open shooters on the perimeter against four out lineups.

Both Barnes and Green will also get significant time at small forward next season.  The off-season improvements of both players will change the Warriors outlook at both small-forward and power-forward.

While a free-agent signing is unlikely due to the Warriors’ salary situation, there are several valuable front court players on the market this offseason that could potentially be obtained through sign and trades or outright signings using the mid-level exception.  Players like Marreese Speights, Elton Brand, Earl Clark, Lamar Odom, Chris Anderson, Mike Dunleavy, and a few others could all potentially be signed under the mid-level exception.  However, that the Warriors choose to sign a power-forward if they are willing to enter the luxury tax, as retaining Jarrett Jack is likely a higher priority for the front office.

The Warriors could pursue alternative routes, including a sign and trade or actual trade but most of the necessary frontcourt improvements can likely be made within the orginazation.

Warriors: Significant Free Agent Signings Since 2002

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

With the Golden State Warriors ready to enter a potentially formative off-season, here is a chronological reflection on the Warriors’ recent free agent successes.

Speedy Claxton: 2003

Claxton played 46 games for the Warriors in the 2004-05 season before being traded along with Dale Davis to the New Orleans Hornets for Baron Davis.  Claxton played 32.6 minutes per game, averaging 13.1 points and 6.2 assists per game.  He was not a very efficient scorer, with an adjusted field goal percentage of 44.1 percent, but managed to attempt 5.1 free throw attempts per 36 minutes.   While his production was decent, Claxton is significant as a key piece to Baron Davis trade.

Brian Cardinal:  2004 

After being waived by the Washington Wizards the previous season, Cardinal signed a one year deal with the Warriors.  In 76 games played, he average 21.5 minutes and 9.6 points per game.  In his lone year with Golden State, The Custodian sure cleaned up.  Cardinal lead the league in true shooting percentage at 62.6 percent, had a plus-20 rating differential, and recorded .212 win shares per 48 minutes, clearly indicative of the elite player we all know Cardinal was, not an insignificant role player.

Kelenna Azubuike:  2007

On January 2nd, 2007, the Warriors signed Azubuike, then playing for the Fort-Worth Developmental League team to his first professional contract.  Azubuike went on to play 205 games over four seasons with the Warriors before being sent to New York in a trade for David Lee.  Though his career was derailed by injuries, Azuibike gave the Warriors consistent defensive effort and perimeter athleticism, and embodied the reckless mentality that carried (or maybe complimented, you know, tangible things like matchups and defense) the Warriors to their upset of Dallas in the 2007 playoffs.

Corey Maggette:  2008

During the 2008 off-season, the Warriors blew up the “We Believe” core, letting Baron Davis sign with the Los Angeles Clippers, and signed Corey Maggette to a then-and-now ridiculous five year, 48 million dollar contract.  He scored relatively efficiently in his two years with the Warriors but struggled with health issues.  Maggette, often an example of the foolish contracts NBA teams “used to” give, was vilified for his poor effort and has become associated with many of the Warriors’ recent failures.

Dorell Wright:  2008 

The summer before the 2010-11 season, Wright signed a 3 year, 10 million dollar contract with the Warriors.  A decent defender and three point shooter, he played 38.4 minutes his first year as a Warrior, but fell out of favor with Mark Jackson towards the end of his second.  More importantly, Wright was sent to the Philadelphia 76ers as part of the three-team trade through which the Warriors acquired Jarrett Jack.

Carl Landry:   2012

Before this season, Landry signed a two year, 8 million dollar contract with the Warriors.  The second year is a player option Landry is expected to drop, allowing the reserve power forward to enter free agency.  Landry served as an efficient scoring big man (True Shooting Percentage of 60.5 percent), was a decent rebounder, and was not fatally flawed defensively.  Though he will likely depart this offseason, Landry was a key to the Warriors’ success.

Kent Bazemore:  2012

The Warriors signed Bazemore after he went undrafted in prior to the season. While Stephen Curry, David Lee, and others dominated on the court, Bazemore made his presence known from the bench.  With Jarrett Jack’s returning next season in doubt and the Warriors flexibility limited, Bazemore may play a vital role on the team sooner than expected.

Warriors: Pros and Cons of Pursuing Dwight Howard

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

For the first time in many years, the Warriors are regarded as a future contender.  While Dwight Howard’s opinion has proven to be untrustworthy, the ability to attract top-level free agents is a drastic change for the Golden State Warriors franchise.  Here are some of the pros-and cons the Warriors will consider with regards to pursuing Dwight Howard.

 

Pro:     When healthy, Dwight Howard is the best center in the league.  Though, likely due to back and shoulder injuries, he struggled this season, Howard has been the league’s premier center for several seasons.  Howard has, or at least recently had, the mobility to cover pick and rolls and rotate on help defense, the strength to defend post ups, the leaping ability to contest shots at the rim, and the positioning to prevent many shots from being attempted.  Offensively, Howard relies on the same mobility and athleticism.  He is stronger than many defenders in the post.  More importantly, he was the single best pick and roll roll-man in the league.  When healthy, he has the mobility to attack the lane, the coordination to catch most passes, and is one of the better finishers at the rim.  With Curry’s shooting and Howard’s finishing, the Warriors’ pick and roll would be a consistent source of efficient offense.  Of course, the same claims were made about the Nash-Howard pick and roll before this season.

 

Pro:     He has been healthy most of his career.  Despite injuries, Howard played 76 regular season games for the Lakers, 92.6 percent of the possible 82.  In terms of games played, 2011-12 was Howard’s worst season.  He played 54 of 66 regular season games, about 81 percent.  In seven other career seasons, he has played a greater percentage, including a full 82 games five times.  Recent issues included, Howard is far less of a health issue than Andrew Bogut.

 

Also worth mentioning is that despite health issues, Howard was not as bad this year as many portrayed him to be.  After a discouraging start, he regained something resembling his typical form over the course of the season.

 

Con:    Chasing Howards restricts off-season mobility.  He is not known for quick decisions (nor good ones).  Though he is likely hesitant to replicate last season’s “Dwight-mare,” Howard’s free agency courting process could easily last weeks.  A dragged out process could prevent the Warriors from making other key moves.

 

Con:    Giving Dwight Howard the maximum four year contract he demands will restrict future flexibility.  Along with Andris Biedrins’ and Richard Jefferson’s, Bogut’s contract expires after next season.  Currently, the Warriors only have 33 million committed to the 2014-2015 season, per basketball-reference.  Adding Howard’s contract, along with the contracts of players included in the trade or brought in to fill roster spots, the Warriors salary flexibility could be drastically decreased.  The possible Klay Thompson extension would kick in during the 2014-15 season and likely join Howard Curry and Lee in a growing collection of big-money contracts pushing the Warriors up to the salary cap.  Harrison Barnes would be due for an extension the year after Thompson (though one of Barnes or Thompson would almost certainly be surrendered in a trade for Howard).  If Howard plays to his typical standards, this decreased flexibility would be a minor issue but given the variability of human health and the NBA, Howard’s contract is a concern.

Con:    He seems committed to fulfilling the historic role of an offensive center.  Amid the chaos of the Laker’s locker-room, there was one constant clamor.  Dwight Howard wanted more touches.  While he finished with the third lowest usage percentage of his career, he still finished with a 21.3 percent usage rate, not ball-dominant, but still a focus of the offense.  The concerning part of his possession pleas was the demand for more “post-touches.”  According to mysynergysports.com, he scored 0.74 points per play in post up situations, 121st in the league.  In the pick and roll, where he has excelled his whole career, Howard scored 1.29 points per play, 8th in the league.  Howard draws attention in the post, freeing up shooters, but his desire for more post-touches indicates a misunderstanding of his own strengths and weaknesses not beneficial to the development of an elite team.

How Does Mike Malone’s Departure Affect the Warriors?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

Mike Malone, the Golden State Warriors assistant coach, will reportedly become the head coach of the Sacramento Kings next season.  Malone is considered to be the “X’s and O’s” brain that compliments Mark Jackson’s motivational skills.

Though television footage of the Warriors’ often shows Malone diagramming plays, there is little concrete evidence as to the extent of Malone’s influence on the Warriors’ plays, schemes, and system.  The Warriors’ coaching staff expands far beyond Jackson and Malone.  The systemic innovations recently enacted may have been created by Malone, to whom public sentiment attributes them, but was just as likely created through a process of intellectual cooperation.

Even if they cannot be fully attributed to Malone, the creation of several important changes to the Warriors’ defensive and offensive strategies coincided with the beginning of Malone’s tenure.

The job of a coach is to put players in the best possible position to succeed.  This may require players to deviate from their preferred roles or even their personal strengths but, as the San Antonio Spurs have shown, is often designed to limit the weaknesses and accentuate the strengths of players at an individual level to the benefit of the team.

In 2010-11, the season before Malone and Jackson joined Golden State, the Warriors started David Lee and Andris Biedrins at power forward and center.  Neither of these players is even remotely quick, but the Warriors’ required them to hedge hard and recover on the majority of pick and rolls they defended.

Though it may look like a trap, this was the Warriors’ standard pick and roll defense in the 2010-11 season.  Many of the Warriors’ big men, Lee and Biedrins especially, were being forced into a position of weakness by the Warriors’ defensive strategy.  Apart from Ekpe Udoh, the Warriors’ big men were generally unable to recover back to their man off the hard-hedge.  Also, the high-hedge leaves only one big defensive player in help position, forcing the remaining big to defend both his man and any guards that beat the hedge or roll men driving before the hedging big can recover.

Beginning with arrival of Malone and Jackson, the Warriors transitioned to a defensive strategy better adapted to the abilities of their personnel.

Notice how David Lee sags all the way into the paint on this high pick and roll.  Instead of hedging the screen and getting stuck 27 feet from the rim, Lee drops into the key, denying the drive and willingly surrendering a mid-range jump shot.

To limit the damage wrought by their big men’s lack of lateral mobility, the Warriors’ often defend pick and rolls with the “Ice “coverage.   In Ice, the guard attempts to prevent the ball-handler from using the screen, while the big man stays below screen-level on the side to which the ball handler is being forced.  Notice how Stephen Curry has jumped in front of Tony Parker to prevent him form using Tiago Splitter’s screen while Andrew Bogut stays in the paint to contain penetration.  While miscommunication may lead to wide open driving lanes and more defensive pressure is placed on the guards, Ice allows the Warriors’ big men to effectively contain pick and roles.

Another addition to the Warriors’ pick and role defense under Malone’s tenure is increased help from wing defenders.  In the image, Klay Thompson has dropped into the paint, leaving his man in the corner open, in an attempt to contain Splitter’s role.  This strategy has been effective in limiting the productivity of opposing role men.  According to mysynergysports.com, the Warriors allowed only 0.9 points per play to role men, the second best rate in the league.  The results of this strategy are entirely beneficial.  The commitment to shutting down role men often leaves opposing shooters open in the corners.  Imagine Tony Parker driving a few steps towards the left elbow, forcing Bogut to commit to containing him.  Parker could then pass to a rolling Splitter.  Thompson would attempt to deny Splitter’s path to the basket, and Kawhi Leonard would likely be wide open in the corner.  That and similar scenario’s play out several times per game versus the Warriors, who surrendered the most three point attempts and corner three point attempts per 48 minutes this season.

Injuries, trades, and draft picks have left the Warriors’ roster in constant flux over the last two seasons.  Thus, the direct impact of Malone is difficult to discern.  The removal of Monte Ellis and addition of Andrew Bogut likely had a large impact on the Warriors’ offensive playbook.  However, the extent of this impact may not have been revealed through Bogut injury issues.

From set plays like the one above to entire offensive systems, the Warriors have undergone significant change during the last two seasons.  Sets such as the now-famous elevator play clearly suggest a dedication to taking advantage of the players’ strengths.

It is unlikely that Malone controlled the Warriors X’s and O’s to extent often reported.  Even if that were the case, do not expect a significant decline in the quality of the Warriors offensive and defensive sets, for though Malone may leave, he has already imparted his knowledge upon the rest of the staff, likely filled with equally brilliant basketball minds.

Could The Warriors Have Beaten The Memphis Grizzlies?

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Monday night, the San Antonio Spurs completed a sweep of the Memphis Grizzlies, securing a spot in the finals and leaving Memphis to join the 26 other teams watching the conference finals on TV.  Though Games 2 and 3 were decided in overtime, the Spurs appeared to be in control throughout the series.  San Antonio dispatched the Golden State Warriors in the second round, but appeared to struggle in the process, losing two games and overcoming a double-digit deficit in the fourth quarter of another.

San Antonio scored 104.4 points per 100 possessions to the Warriors in their second round series, and allowed 99.7, per nba.com.  In the four games versus Memphis, the Spurs scored 105.3 points per 100 possessions, and allowed 93.4.   During the regular season, the Grizzlies allowed only 100.3 points per 100 possessions, second only to the Indiana Pacers, and scored 104.9.  As was expected, Memphis affected San Antonio’s offensive production.  Memphis had been scoring at a top ten rate after the Rudy Gay trade, and likely needed to maintain at least average offensive production to beat San Antonio.  Instead, San Antonio held Memphis to an offensive rating 6.8 points per 100 possessions worse than the league-worst Washington Wizards’ season production.

Despite the drastic difference in performance versus San Antonio, the Warriors’ success relative to Memphis should not be perceived as superiority.  Though teams work to become versatile, performance in the NBA is often dictated by match-ups, and the Spurs are better equipped to overcome Memphis’ strengths and take advantage of their weaknesses than the Warriors.

Led by Zach Randolph and Marc Gasol, Memphis finished 15.7% of their offensive possessions with a post up, according to mysynergysports.com.  The post-up itself is not a very efficient offensive weapon.  The 8th ranked Grizzlies scored 0.86 points per play off post ups and 0.9 points per play overall.  However posting up, especially if it forces the defense to double team, as Randolph and Gasol often do, forces defenses to adjust, drawing help defenders, forcing rotations, and opening other opportunities for the offense.

The removal of David Lee skews the data, but the Warriors allowed 0.85 points per play to post ups this season, 19th in the league.  Andrew Bogut, as he showed against Tim Duncan, is a very good post defender, but the other Warriors defenders lack the size, strength, mobility, or defensive intelligence to be effective versus Randolph and Gasol.  San Antonio, conversely, allowed only 0.76 points per play to post ups, best in the league.

The more significant difference is between the two teams help strategies against post ups.

Here, the Warriors allow San Antonio to make a clean inbounds pass, leaving Tim Duncan isolated in the post against Carl Landry.  Only after Duncan has established deep post position, Klay Thompson leaves Manu Ginobili at the top of the key to help on Duncan.  Thompson’s help defense is not aggressive enough to affect Duncan’s move, but leaves Manu Ginobili wide open for three one pass from the ball.   The Grizzlies spot-up shooters are far less of a concern than San Antonio’s, making this defense still unacceptable defense less damaging. Even against Memphis, surrendering decent spot up opportunities is poor defense.  Though they ranked 28th in the league in spot up points play, the 0.9 points per play scored by Memphis of spot ups is equally efficient to their overall offense and more efficient than a post up field goal attempt.

Tiago Splitter and Tim Duncan give San Antonio the ability to defend post-ups without double-teaming.  Also, San Antonio’s pre-post up defense is generally more effective than the Warriors.  The Spurs’ wing defenders, especially Kawhi Leonard, are very good at harassing in bounds passers and helping on to posting big men prior to an entry pass.  Entry passes are made even more difficult by San Antonio’s commitment to fronting the post.

At 31 percent, the Grizzlies have the second highest offensive rebound percentage in the league. Memphis has the league’s 3rd least efficient offense off offensive rebounds, scoring 1.01 points per play according to mysynergysports.com.  But as with spot ups, Memphis’ inefficiency relative to the rest of the league does not mean plays ending in a shot off an offensive rebound are inefficient relative to Memphis’ own offense.  Of the categories tracked by Synergy, offensive rebounds is the third most efficient source of offense for the Grizzlies, trailing only cut and transition opportunities.

With David Lee off the court, the Warriors allowed a 58.6 percent offensive rebound percentage to shots by the opponent generated off offensive rebounds, compared to only 43.9 percent off a made field goal or free throw (To clarify: after the Warriors made a field goal or free throw, the Warriors allowed their opponents to shoot 43.9 percent adjusted field goal percentage) and 46.8 percent off a defensive rebound (meaning after the Warriors missed a field goal or free throw attempt, and the Warriors’ opponent rebounded, the Warriors opponent shot a 46.8 percent adjusted field goal percentage), according to nbawowy.com.  The Spurs allowed only 51.0 percent effective field goal percentage shooting after offensive rebounds.

Given the limited sample size of the Warriors’ without David Lee and with a healthy Andrew Bogut, it is difficult to predict the results of a hypothetical Memphis-Golden State series.  Perhaps the injuries to Stephen Curry and Andrew Bogut that affected their performance versus San Antonio may not have occurred, but given the injury history of those two players, that cannot be guaranteed.

Mike Conley and Tony Allen are elite on ball perimeter defenders and a threat to the Warriors hypothetical offensive production.  However, despite his on-ball prowess, Allen is not a consistent off ball defender, often straying off his man in misguided attempts to wreak havoc on opposing offenses.  Had Lionel Hollins chosen to defend Stephen Curry with Tony Allen, the Warriors use of Curry off the ball may have had more success than it did against the Spurs.  However, had Curry not injured his ankle he may never have shifted into this off ball role, in which case Allen and Conley may have drastically decreased his offensive efficiency.

While the Warriors would not be guaranteed a loss versus the Grizzlies, they would not be able to target Memphis’ weaknesses and limit their strengths as effectively as the Spurs.

Andrew Bogut and David Lee: Best Passing Big Men Tandem Ever?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

The Golden State Warriors intended started big men, Andrew Bogut and David Lee, played only 31 games, 720 minutes, together for the season.  The Bogut-Lee frontoucourt has many strengths and many flaws.  But amid the rebounding success, transition struggles, and other features of the pair, the unique passing ability stands out.

Of all the Warriors 2-man lineups to log over 100 minutes, the Bogut-Lee pairing trailed only Lee-Jarrett Jack in assist percentage.   While the assist percentage team-dependent both Bogut and Lee are very good passers, and together, form one of the best passing big-men tandems in the league.

Both Lee and Bogut are excellent interior passers, consistently finding cutters and opposite big men for easy layups as defenses rotate, but the tandem’s passing talent expands beyond typical big men skills.

The Warriors offense relied on Bogut and Lee’s ability to find shooters out of a pick and roll.  Often on the move, Lee and Bogut balanced a scoring threat with the ability to launch a pinpoint pass to nearly anywhere on the court at angles and to players unexpected by the defense.  Of course, Bogut and Lee’s passing could not be truly enjoyed without the added flair they often provide.

To Bogut especially, this flair is often detrimental.  What could be a simple chest pass is often a one handed rocket.  To Bogut, a defender just adds an object around which a pass must be thread, and though the point result remains the same, added risk creates an apparent sense of accomplishment.  Though many of his passes are as enjoyable as any monster dunk, an unnecessary amount of turnovers are generated by Bogut’s forced passes.

While Bogut is guilty of overpassing, Lee goes through periods of limited court vision, especially with an open driving lane.  Lee makes many impressive passes but often fails to attempt simple ones.  On countless occasions Lee has missed an open Klay Thompson in the strong-side corner as he drives down the lane.

The Bogut-Lee frontcourt faces an inherent weakness as passers.  When the Warriors shifted to a small-ball lineup after Lee’s injury, they did not suffer from decreased ball movement, despite the removal of Lee, a very good passer, from the lineup.  The presence of two big men constantly within 17 feet of the basket limits spacing.  Small-ball lineups are generally known for opening driving opportunities, but the added spacing also creates passing lanes not available with two big men and their defenders clogging the middle of the court.

Along with Al Horford and Josh Smith, Boris Diaw and Tim Duncan, Marc Gasol and Zach Randolph, and many other big men tandems, Lee and Bogut consistently pressure defenses in ways most players cannot.

Though best ever is a stretch far greater than that into which Bogut and Lee force defenses, the pair may follow Divac-Webber and Gasol-Odom as the next great west coast passing tandem.

Can Klay Thompson Develop As A Scorer?

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In what fans hope soon becomes a less rare occasion, the Golden State Warriors are not going to spend their offseason scouting potential lottery picks.  The refreshing lack of draft picks does not remove the doubts of the typical off-season.  Though the players were already on the roster, the principle remains the same: the Warriors are hoping that their young players, Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, Harrison Barnes, Draymond Green, Festus Ezeli, and even Kent Bazemore are able to improve.

 

Klay Thompson’s recently addressed defensive improvements salvaged a frustrating offensive season.  In a pre-season ESPN poll surveying 30 league officials, Klay Thompson was voted “most likely to breakout,” and though his defense was a revelation, this almost certainly predicted an offensive explosion.  Instead, Thompson was inconsistent; sometimes brilliant, sometimes depressing, and nearly always confusing.

 

Thompson clearly has offensive skills.  At 1.26 points per play, he ranked 16th in points per play in spot up situations according to mysynergysports.com, despite a shot selection likely poorer than comparable shooters.

 

Most of Thompson’s offensive game is built around his shooting ability.  He is always a threat spotting up, often in transition.  As the his offensive role expanded, Thompson became the beneficiary of many of the Warriors’ off-ball actions.  He is Stephen Curry’s partner in many of the Warriors cross screen sets and runs countless pin-downs per game.

 

 

As he established himself as a scoring threat off these pin-down style plays, further offensive opportunities emerged.  Defenders often overplay to deny the jump shot, allowing Thompson to get into the lane.  Though his 55.3 percent field goal percentage within five feet of the rim is slightly below average, that amounts to 1.106 points per shot, excluding free throws.  With free throw attempts included, the Warriors scored 1.085 points per shot this season.

 

Once Thompson became a threat to drive off overplays, defensive big men began stepping into his driving lane, allowing him to pass down to the offensive big man rolling off the screen.  As the season progressed, Thompson improved at reading the defense in these situations.

 

With improved shot selection and more consistent footwork, Thompson can become a very effective offensive player on the already established base of his shooting ability, but can he improve beyond that point?  As Kawhi Leonard so eagerly displayed, good defenders can take away much of Thompson’s efficient option.

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Many of Klay Thompson’s inefficiencies are generated by struggles around the rim.  He can get by his man, but does not have the explosion to beat the rotating big men to the rim.  Thompson is forced into taking many layups from beyond his limited comfort zone.  An improved finishing ability would obviously make Thompson a more potent scorer.  He blows several transition opportunities per game, both from a fear of driving and an inability to convert when he does drive.  Thompson’s fear of contact at the rim should draw no comparisons to the problem that once haunted Derrick Rose.  While Rose contorted his body to avoid contact and finish the layup, Thompson consistently jumps to early or at awkward angles in trying to simply get a shot off.  As he becomes more comfortable with NBA defense, Thompson may be able to draw fouls at a rate higher than the 0.11 free throws per field goal attempt he drew this season.

 

Towards the end of the season, Thompson revealed another aspect to his offensive game.  Often off 1-2 pick and rolls, he began posting up defenders, usually in the mid-post below the elbow.

 

 

Thompson often takes the fade-away, but is also able to get defenders off balance and drive into the lane, opening up kick-outs to shooters and dump off passes to big men. Several of the actions Thompson already runs would allow him to take advantage of a more developed post offense.   Misdirections and seals can be incorporated into many of the Warriors’ sets.  The baseline runner in the flex-style offense shown in the video above has many opportunities for deep post position.

 

 

The Warriors’ corner sets offer another opportunity to create post touches for Thompson.  At 0:56, Thompson stops his cut below the basket instead of continuing to the perimeter, allowing him to seal off Manu Ginobli for an easy layup.

 

The greatest impediment to Thompson becoming a consistent scorer is his dribbling ability.  For many players, dribbling is one of the most difficult skills to improve. Thompson will likely never have the control or creativity to be an effective off the dribble scorer, but developing a steady handle will open many more opportunities.

 

According to mysynergysports.com, Thompson finished 7.5 percent of his plays as a pick and roll ball handler, very low for a high-usage guard, and was very inefficient in these situations, scoring only 0.57 points per play.  Better dribbling and more consistent footwork when shooting off the dribble will allow Thompson to use the pick and roll as a secondary option after several off-ball sets.

 

 

With an improved handle, Thompson’s already established off-ball prowess will increase the Warriors offensive options.  Sets similar to the Denver Nuggets single down imitate the pin-down the Warriors typically run to open Thompson for a mid-range jumper, but are designed to give the offensive player a lane through the middle of the court.  By adding wrinkles to his own game, Thompson allows the Warriors to diversify their offense and put Thompson in better scoring position.

 

 

Teams like the San Antonio Spurs and Indiana Pacers often have wing players cut across big men in the high post for handoffs.  Players like Paul George are given lanes to the basket, as the high-post big man’s defender is likely out of position to pick up a drive as he defends his man.  When defenders go under the screen, the cutter is generally given an open jump shot.  With improvements to his dribbling and finishing, Klay Thompson could be very effective in similar situations.

 

Klay Thompson needs only to make minor improvements to become an efficient scorer in his current role.  Improvements beyond shot selection and minor footwork will be needed for him to become the diverse wing scorer the Warriors currently lack.

Will Harrison Barnes Develop Behind Curry and Thompson?

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

With their recent success and wealth of young talent, the Warriors are considered a team on the rise.  But despite Curry’s star-power, how far they rise may be dictated by the development of Harrison Barnes.  Barnes, the karmic reward for Charles Jenkins’ 2011-2012 late season heroics, David Lee’s “unfortunate” injury, and most definitely not shameless, calculated, and committed tanking, has the highest ceiling of any non-Curry player on the roster.

 

 

Though he may not realize it, Harrison Barnes is extremely athletic, as Nikola Pekovic can confirm.  While his athleticism may be his greatest asset, Barnes rarely appears to be fully engaging his athletic ability.  Offensively, he will often resort to his nonchalant, rehearsed, and entirely inefficient mid-range jumper over a drive to the rim.  Barnes’ lack of aggression with the ball is further accented off the ball.  He tends to disappear for lengthy stretches, and rarely actively puts himself in position to affect the game.

 

Barnes’ general lack of aggression is not inexcusable.  While his playoff performance may suggest otherwise, Barnes was often the fourth or fifth scoring option for the Warriors, and rarely was required to create offensively.  However, to maximize both his and the Warriors’ potential, Barnes will likely need to expand his role offensively, and develop the skills that allow him to do so.

 

The problem facing the Warriors, a problem they likely do not mind having, is that established young talent already occupies much of the role Barnes may seek to grow into. Stephen Curry and Klay Thompson appear set to be the Warriors’ primary offensive weapons for years to come, barring any core changing trade.  Barnes’ offensive attack would likely be different from Thompson or Curry’s.  Offensively, the ideal Barnes repeatedly attacks the rim, taking advantage of his athleticism and finishing ability, and draws help defenders, opening Thompson and Curry.

 

Barnes’ ability to fulfill this role is limited by his currently no better than mediocre dribbling ability.  Barnes often appears very rigid when moving on the court.  He is a capable dribbler, but lacking the ability to quickly react to his defenders movements, he is restricted to committing to a move or destination and picking up or clearing out if he cannot beat his man.

 

Klay Thompson suffers from the same dribbling deficiencies as Barnes.  Both players’ potential can only be maximized if they develop their dribbling ability, and both will likely spend countless hours attempting to improve their handle during the offseason.  The potential impact of this practice is unknown, and the Warriors may struggle to find sufficient in game situations for each player to develop their abilities.  Now that they expect to contend for a playoff spot, the Warriors will likely not be able to dedicate regular season possessions to Barnes and Thompson’s development.  Though Jarrett Jack may think otherwise, the Warriors are at their best offensively with the ball in Curry’s hand, and the margin for error next season may be smaller than Warriors’ fans expect.

 

It is difficult to predict Thompson and Curry’s impact on Barnes’ development.  While they may limit his growth, Barnes could also have an experience similar to Kawhi Leonard in San Antonio. With Curry and Thompson as an offensive safety net, Barnes may be able to expand his game without being immediately relied upon to support the team, and can refine his dribbling skills without having to compromise his development for immediate team performance.

 

The development of Harrison Barnes, Klay Thompson, and the Warriors’ young core is expected, but for the Warriors to approach a high level of contention a core similar to the current one, several players will have to make drastic improvements.