Tag Archives: David Lee

Areas David Lee Needs To Improve On Defense

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Despite his offensive contribution, David Lee’s overall value is limited.  Simply put, Lee is a very bad defensive player.  While the entirety of his defense could use improvement, here are the aspects of defense David Lee could feasibly improve that have the greatest effect on the Warriors.

Isolation:
According to mysynergysports.com, David Lee allowed 0.94 points per possession against isolations, 277th in the league.  At this point in his career, it is highly unlikely that Lee becomes an above average defender.  He is limited by athleticism and mobility.  Despite his physical disadvantages, many of Lee’s defensive issues are a product of poor fundamentals.  His footwork and initial positioning is often flawed and he has a tendency to bite on most pump fakes.

Here David Lee is defending a big man, LaMarcus Aldridge, in an isolation situation.  First off, Lee’s initial stance is problematic.  He is completely vertical on the catch and barely bends his knees once Aldridge turns to the basket.  Lee’s positioning is also an issue.  He is positioned as if to force Aldridge to his right towards the baseline, as most defenses would.  Lee has his body oriented correctly but is not actually denying Aldridge any lane.  He should be a step closer to the elbow, completely preventing Aldridge form getting to the middle of the court.  There is not enough space for Aldridge to turn the corner going right.

Instead, Lee allows Aldridge to go left into the middle of the lane.  Lee is not quick enough to cut off Aldridge’s progress, displaying his physical deficiencies.  As Aldridge turns back, Lee reveals another one of his defensive flaws.  When he should simply hold his position, Lee jumps forward.  This could prevent Aldridge from taking a shot, though Aldridge had a nice counter move, but moving into rather than holding position against an offensive player generally results in a foul.  According to mysynergysports.com, Lee commits a shooting foul on 8.6 percent of the isolations he faces.  This, along with non-shooting fouls, increases individual foul trouble and brings opponents into the bonus.

Lee’s positioning and footwork issues also affect him against perimeter players.

Here, Lee is switched onto Tony Parker following a pick and roll.  Against Parker, he should focus on not allowing an open jumper.  Parker will be able to get a relatively easy jumper regardless of Lee’s defense, while allowing him into the lane allows a layup and opens kick out opportunities to higher value threes.  Once switched onto Parker, Lee should immediately sag towards the paint, as it is highly unlikely that Parker takes an off-the-dribble three.  Also, Lee does not position himself well to keep Parker out of the middle of the court.

Lee follows Parker towards the sideline, allowing Parker to cross back over and get to the middle of the key.  This is obviously easier said than done, but Lee should attempt to force Parker to drive baseline, where Parker can be corralled without forcing help defenders to leave wide-open shooters.

Despite several years in the league, Lee does not have the defensive recognition and fundamentals necessary to compensate for his limited athleticism.

Post-Up: 

In post up situations, Lee’s poor defensive awareness and positioning is the main culprit of his struggles, while limited leaping ability serves to exacerbate these issues.  According to mysynergysports.com, Lee allows 0.84 points per play to post-ups, 159th in the league. Lee’s on ball post defense is poor.  He does not have the length to contest most shots and, as his unnecessary step towards LaMarcus Aldridge shows, he generally practices poor individual defensive technique.  He commits a shooting foul on 12.2 percent of post up situations and often will place both hands on the back of an offensive player, warranting an automatic whistle.

However, despite his significant on-ball struggles, David Lee’s post-up weakness is likely a product of poor positioning and off-ball defense.

On this possession, the Warriors’ are playing zone.  Though many defenses utilize weak side zone principles anyway, a zone defense typically requires increased defensive awareness from big men, who must now deal with baseline cutters and post movement in addition to help responsibilities.  Here, Lee loses track of Kosta Koufos as he stands out of bounds (an action that may soon be disallowed).  Even after noticing Koufos, Lee does not fully engage, allowing Koufos to cut to the middle of the lane for ideal post position.

Even in man-to-man defense, Lee often allows deep post position, especially to roll men and after cross screens.  He does not often appear to recognize the importance of post position and is rarely gives the effort necessary to force opponents out of this position.  Again, Lee’s effort and positioning lead to defensive struggles.

Pick and Roll: 

According to mysynergysports.com, Lee allows only 0.6 points per play to roll men, 10th best in the league!  However, this disguises the damaging effect of Lee’s pick and roll defense.  In the last couple seasons, the Warriors have reconstructed their defense to compensate for Lee’s poor pick and roll defense.  I covered the reconstruction of the Warriors’ pick and roll defense when describing how assistant coach Mike Malone affected the Warriors:

“To limit the damage wrought by their big men’s lack of lateral mobility, the Warriors often defend pick and rolls with the “Ice “coverage.

In Ice, the guard attempts to prevent the ball-handler from using the screen, while the big man stays below screen-level on the side to which the ball handler is being forced. Notice how Stephen Curry has jumped in front of Tony Parker to prevent him from using Tiago Splitter’s screen while Andrew Bogut stays in the paint to contain penetration. Miscommunication may lead to wide open driving lanes and more defensive pressure is placed on the guards, but Ice allows the Warriors’ big men to effectively contain pick and rolls.

Another addition to the Warriors’ pick-and-roll defense under Malone’s tenure is increased help from wing defenders.  In the image, Klay Thompson has dropped into the paint, leaving his man in the corner open, in an attempt to contain Splitter’s role. This strategy has been effective in limiting the productivity of opposing roll men.  According to mysynergysports.com, the Warriors allowed only 0.9 points per play to role men, the second-best rate in the league.

The results of this strategy are entirely beneficial.  The commitment to shutting down role men often leaves opposing shooters open in the corners. Imagine Parker driving a few steps towards the left elbow, forcing Bogut to commit to containing him. Parker could then pass to a rolling Splitter. Thompson would attempt to deny Splitter’s path to the basket, and Kawhi Leonard would likely be wide open in the corner. That and similar scenarios play out several times per game versus the Warriors, who surrendered the most three-point attempts and corner three point attempts per 48 minutes this season”

David Lee is slow laterally and practically immobile when changing direction.  He often struggles to contain ball handlers in “Ice” coverage, a strategy used to limit his weaknesses, and is slow to recover to his man, forcing the Warriors to compensate by having help defenders rotate down to the roll man.

Though a lack of athleticism may be the root of his defensive issues, much of Lee’s defensive futility is generated by poor positioning, footwork, and awareness.  It may be unlikely that any significant changes occur at this point in his career but even minor improvements to the non-athleticism based components of defense will increase David Lee’s value to the Warriors.

How Can The Warriors’ Front Court Improve In 2013-2014?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

Carl Landry is expected to leave as a free agent this summer.  Despite this, the Warriors’ frontcourt should be able to improve going into next season, complimenting an already elite backcourt.

The easiest route to a superior frontcourt comes through internal improvements. Improved health from Andrew Bogut could give him increased mobility and comfort in the offense, potentially improving the Warriors both offensively and defensively.  Festus Ezeli, Bogut’s back up, was a rookie in the 2012-13 season and should improve naturally as he increases his understanding of NBA rotations and positioning.  Ezeli’s offensive game was close to non-existent this season, mostly due to an inability to catch less-than-perfect pass, especially when on the move.  If Ezeli’s “hands” improve, he may become more of a threat to finish pick and rolls, secure offensive rebounds, and take advantage of opportunities when opposing big men abandon him to play help defense.

At power-forward, Draymond Green showed promise during the Warriors’ playoff run.  Green is already a very good defender and has potential as a stretch four offensively.  He shot only 20.9 percent from three in his first year but improved to 39.1 percent during the playoffs.  Even as a poor shooter, Green’s position on the perimeter forces defenders to a few steps further out of the paint that David Lee typically would offensively.  Though inconsistent, Green often shows good court vision and was a very good rebounder in college.  He finished the season with an assist percentage of only 7.0 percent and a total rebound percentage of 13.5 percent (many of his minutes came at small forward, affecting rebounding numbers) but has the fundamentals and physical abilities to be an above average rebounder.  Any offensive improvement from Green would be a welcome addition to his already excellent defense and could greatly improve the Warriors’ frontcourt.

Harrison Barnes, like fellow rookie Green, had success playing power-forward during the playoffs.  Though it is unlikely that the Warriors rely on Barnes as a full-time power-forward, stretches of small ball could help the Warriors replicate their playoff success.  At power-forward, Barnes is able to attack slower players from the perimeter and has fewer defensive big men to account for at the rim. Many power-forwards are not accustomed to defending players on the perimeter, giving Barnes, a 35.9 percent three point shooter, open opportunities. Even when opponents add a perimeter player to match the Warriors, defensive help schemes often force opponents to leave open shooters on the perimeter against four out lineups.

Both Barnes and Green will also get significant time at small forward next season.  The off-season improvements of both players will change the Warriors outlook at both small-forward and power-forward.

While a free-agent signing is unlikely due to the Warriors’ salary situation, there are several valuable front court players on the market this offseason that could potentially be obtained through sign and trades or outright signings using the mid-level exception.  Players like Marreese Speights, Elton Brand, Earl Clark, Lamar Odom, Chris Anderson, Mike Dunleavy, and a few others could all potentially be signed under the mid-level exception.  However, that the Warriors choose to sign a power-forward if they are willing to enter the luxury tax, as retaining Jarrett Jack is likely a higher priority for the front office.

The Warriors could pursue alternative routes, including a sign and trade or actual trade but most of the necessary frontcourt improvements can likely be made within the orginazation.

Devising The Warriors’ Offseason Plan

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

The Golden State Warriors received some bad news last week.  Yes, Stephen Curry’s ankle is still attached to his leg, and no, Andrew Bogut has not lost his affinity for looping behind the back passes, nor has he lost his consistently entertaining Australian accent.  Instead, the NBA reported that expected salary cap for next season is now 58.5 million, only slightly higher than the current cap. Prior estimates expected a salary cap closer to 60 million dollars, which would result in a higher luxury tax line.  With a lower tax level, the Warriors’ salary issues are amplified, leaving even less flexibility in a very important offseason.  Here are four paths the Warriors could take this off-season, each with its own rewards, detriments, and underlying philosophy.

Option One:   Convince Andris Biedrins and Richard Jefferson to leave the team to pursue careers as comedians, thus voiding their contracts.  As their on court performance shows, Biedrins and Jefferson have already mastered the art of comedy.  While the basketball world appreciates their current comedic endeavors, Biedrins and Jefferson could appeal to a much wider audience.  As neither player learned the playbook, their on-court improvisation would likely translate to the stage.  Removing Biedrins and Jefferson’s contracts would resolve the Warriors binding salary problems with minimal detriment to the two, save for many millions of dollars.  But really, what do ten million dollars matter when you could bring smiles to millions of people?

Option Two:   Last season, the Warriors traded Charles Jenkins and Jeremy Tyler to get below the tax line.  While it saved money during the year, it was a move for the future.  Teams that are in the luxury tax for three straight are subject to a more punitive luxury tax.  By avoiding the luxury tax last year, the Warriors allowed themselves to enter the luxury tax this coming season with a three year barrier prior to repeater tax exposure.  Re-signing Jarrett Jack at anything remotely close to market value would push the Warriors over the luxury tax line.

The Warriors only have 33 million dollars in guaranteed salary in the 2014-2015 season.  Do not confuse this with future flexibility, not including a potential Jack extension.  But future free agent beware, this number will not hold.  Including a hypothetical Jack extension, the Warriors would have around 40 million dollars guaranteed to only six players.  Filling out a roster with anything other than players on rookie or minimum contracts would push the Warriors close to the luxury tax with Klay Thompson and the 2012-13 rookie class’s extensions pending.

For those who believe the Warriors current core can succeed as players develop, re-signing Jack allows the Warriors to maintain current levels of play while still planning for the future.  However, the reliance on Jack may limit the development of the Warriors’ perimeter players.  Stephen Curry was often used in an off-ball role as he shared the court with Jack.  Stephen Curry is already an elite offensive player, but the reliance on Jack, especially at the end of games, could limit his development as a consistent player.  Jack’s presence prevents Klay Thompson and Harrison Barnes from taking over as secondary ball handlers.  Though both would likely struggle in that role, Thompson and Barnes’ future dribbling ability will help dictate their future levels of play.  Jack also keeps Kent Bazemore, a potential defensively impactful backup point guard, out of the rotation, limiting his ability to improve.  Jack may raise the Warriors short-term ceiling, but his long term effect is unknown.

Option Three:  Adding a superstar to an already-good team without cap space is very challenging.  Unlikely though it may be, Dwight Howard presents the opportunity for the Warriors to add an all-star level player to the roster.  I already addressed many of the pros and cons of pursuing Howard, one of the few superstars potentially attainable.

The Warriors almost certainly must be willing to surrender a young player to acquire Howard and risk upsetting players if the trade does not go through, but the rewards would be a player who raises the Warriors potential to heights not seen in many, many years.

Option Four:  The philosophical antithesis to option two, the Warriors could let Jack and Landry walk and look to trade David Lee.  The Warriors had success in the playoffs without Lee but this is less about short-term success and more about the future.  Lee is set to receive $44,383 over the next three years, an unjustified burden on the already financially bound Warriors.  Especially given his salary, Lee may limit the Warriors ceiling.

Interior defense and pick and roll coverage are vital to a good defense.  The laterally slow David Lee cowers at the mere mention of a speedy ball handler (or rather, waits five seconds to react and then cowers), and is still confused as to why a disappointed glare is not enough to stop opponents at the rim.

To accommodate for Lee’s defensive shortcomings, the Warriors over-compensate with help defense.  On this Parker-Diaw pick and roll, Klay Thompson comes all the way to the edge of the paint, knowing Lee is likely to be late recovering to Diaw.  The Warriors often help this aggressively on the roll-man side when he is in the pick and roll, often resulting in open corner three point attempts for the opponent. David Lee is one of the worst interior defenders in the NBA.

However, his struggles are not limited to help and pick and roll defense.  In addition to being a very bad defender in two of the most vital aspects of NBA defense, Lee struggles to defend his own man, allowing 0.94 points per play in isolation, 276th in the league, according to mysynergysports.com.

While teams can generally hid poor perimeter defenders, bad interior defenders are often crippling.  Lee’s contract and defense place a potential ceiling on the Warriors.  With increased playing time for Draymond Green and Harrison Barnes, and the potentially trade return at power-forward, the Warriors could replace Lee’s passing and scoring with the valuable spacing he does not provide to keep the Warriors functional offensively. Though letting Lee, Landry, and Jack walk may cause the Warriors to decline next season, they would be in a better position for the future.

As a younger fan, perhaps I do not appreciate the rare success the Warriors had this season.  A step back after the first step forward in a long time may discourage fans who are content with consistent playoff appearances.  It is difficult to envision a championship team built around Lee’s salary and defense, though as Kevin Garnett so eagerly reminds us, “anything is possible.”

Warriors: Pros and Cons of Pursuing Dwight Howard

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

For the first time in many years, the Warriors are regarded as a future contender.  While Dwight Howard’s opinion has proven to be untrustworthy, the ability to attract top-level free agents is a drastic change for the Golden State Warriors franchise.  Here are some of the pros-and cons the Warriors will consider with regards to pursuing Dwight Howard.

 

Pro:     When healthy, Dwight Howard is the best center in the league.  Though, likely due to back and shoulder injuries, he struggled this season, Howard has been the league’s premier center for several seasons.  Howard has, or at least recently had, the mobility to cover pick and rolls and rotate on help defense, the strength to defend post ups, the leaping ability to contest shots at the rim, and the positioning to prevent many shots from being attempted.  Offensively, Howard relies on the same mobility and athleticism.  He is stronger than many defenders in the post.  More importantly, he was the single best pick and roll roll-man in the league.  When healthy, he has the mobility to attack the lane, the coordination to catch most passes, and is one of the better finishers at the rim.  With Curry’s shooting and Howard’s finishing, the Warriors’ pick and roll would be a consistent source of efficient offense.  Of course, the same claims were made about the Nash-Howard pick and roll before this season.

 

Pro:     He has been healthy most of his career.  Despite injuries, Howard played 76 regular season games for the Lakers, 92.6 percent of the possible 82.  In terms of games played, 2011-12 was Howard’s worst season.  He played 54 of 66 regular season games, about 81 percent.  In seven other career seasons, he has played a greater percentage, including a full 82 games five times.  Recent issues included, Howard is far less of a health issue than Andrew Bogut.

 

Also worth mentioning is that despite health issues, Howard was not as bad this year as many portrayed him to be.  After a discouraging start, he regained something resembling his typical form over the course of the season.

 

Con:    Chasing Howards restricts off-season mobility.  He is not known for quick decisions (nor good ones).  Though he is likely hesitant to replicate last season’s “Dwight-mare,” Howard’s free agency courting process could easily last weeks.  A dragged out process could prevent the Warriors from making other key moves.

 

Con:    Giving Dwight Howard the maximum four year contract he demands will restrict future flexibility.  Along with Andris Biedrins’ and Richard Jefferson’s, Bogut’s contract expires after next season.  Currently, the Warriors only have 33 million committed to the 2014-2015 season, per basketball-reference.  Adding Howard’s contract, along with the contracts of players included in the trade or brought in to fill roster spots, the Warriors salary flexibility could be drastically decreased.  The possible Klay Thompson extension would kick in during the 2014-15 season and likely join Howard Curry and Lee in a growing collection of big-money contracts pushing the Warriors up to the salary cap.  Harrison Barnes would be due for an extension the year after Thompson (though one of Barnes or Thompson would almost certainly be surrendered in a trade for Howard).  If Howard plays to his typical standards, this decreased flexibility would be a minor issue but given the variability of human health and the NBA, Howard’s contract is a concern.

Con:    He seems committed to fulfilling the historic role of an offensive center.  Amid the chaos of the Laker’s locker-room, there was one constant clamor.  Dwight Howard wanted more touches.  While he finished with the third lowest usage percentage of his career, he still finished with a 21.3 percent usage rate, not ball-dominant, but still a focus of the offense.  The concerning part of his possession pleas was the demand for more “post-touches.”  According to mysynergysports.com, he scored 0.74 points per play in post up situations, 121st in the league.  In the pick and roll, where he has excelled his whole career, Howard scored 1.29 points per play, 8th in the league.  Howard draws attention in the post, freeing up shooters, but his desire for more post-touches indicates a misunderstanding of his own strengths and weaknesses not beneficial to the development of an elite team.

How Does Mike Malone’s Departure Affect the Warriors?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

Mike Malone, the Golden State Warriors assistant coach, will reportedly become the head coach of the Sacramento Kings next season.  Malone is considered to be the “X’s and O’s” brain that compliments Mark Jackson’s motivational skills.

Though television footage of the Warriors’ often shows Malone diagramming plays, there is little concrete evidence as to the extent of Malone’s influence on the Warriors’ plays, schemes, and system.  The Warriors’ coaching staff expands far beyond Jackson and Malone.  The systemic innovations recently enacted may have been created by Malone, to whom public sentiment attributes them, but was just as likely created through a process of intellectual cooperation.

Even if they cannot be fully attributed to Malone, the creation of several important changes to the Warriors’ defensive and offensive strategies coincided with the beginning of Malone’s tenure.

The job of a coach is to put players in the best possible position to succeed.  This may require players to deviate from their preferred roles or even their personal strengths but, as the San Antonio Spurs have shown, is often designed to limit the weaknesses and accentuate the strengths of players at an individual level to the benefit of the team.

In 2010-11, the season before Malone and Jackson joined Golden State, the Warriors started David Lee and Andris Biedrins at power forward and center.  Neither of these players is even remotely quick, but the Warriors’ required them to hedge hard and recover on the majority of pick and rolls they defended.

Though it may look like a trap, this was the Warriors’ standard pick and roll defense in the 2010-11 season.  Many of the Warriors’ big men, Lee and Biedrins especially, were being forced into a position of weakness by the Warriors’ defensive strategy.  Apart from Ekpe Udoh, the Warriors’ big men were generally unable to recover back to their man off the hard-hedge.  Also, the high-hedge leaves only one big defensive player in help position, forcing the remaining big to defend both his man and any guards that beat the hedge or roll men driving before the hedging big can recover.

Beginning with arrival of Malone and Jackson, the Warriors transitioned to a defensive strategy better adapted to the abilities of their personnel.

Notice how David Lee sags all the way into the paint on this high pick and roll.  Instead of hedging the screen and getting stuck 27 feet from the rim, Lee drops into the key, denying the drive and willingly surrendering a mid-range jump shot.

To limit the damage wrought by their big men’s lack of lateral mobility, the Warriors’ often defend pick and rolls with the “Ice “coverage.   In Ice, the guard attempts to prevent the ball-handler from using the screen, while the big man stays below screen-level on the side to which the ball handler is being forced.  Notice how Stephen Curry has jumped in front of Tony Parker to prevent him form using Tiago Splitter’s screen while Andrew Bogut stays in the paint to contain penetration.  While miscommunication may lead to wide open driving lanes and more defensive pressure is placed on the guards, Ice allows the Warriors’ big men to effectively contain pick and roles.

Another addition to the Warriors’ pick and role defense under Malone’s tenure is increased help from wing defenders.  In the image, Klay Thompson has dropped into the paint, leaving his man in the corner open, in an attempt to contain Splitter’s role.  This strategy has been effective in limiting the productivity of opposing role men.  According to mysynergysports.com, the Warriors allowed only 0.9 points per play to role men, the second best rate in the league.  The results of this strategy are entirely beneficial.  The commitment to shutting down role men often leaves opposing shooters open in the corners.  Imagine Tony Parker driving a few steps towards the left elbow, forcing Bogut to commit to containing him.  Parker could then pass to a rolling Splitter.  Thompson would attempt to deny Splitter’s path to the basket, and Kawhi Leonard would likely be wide open in the corner.  That and similar scenario’s play out several times per game versus the Warriors, who surrendered the most three point attempts and corner three point attempts per 48 minutes this season.

Injuries, trades, and draft picks have left the Warriors’ roster in constant flux over the last two seasons.  Thus, the direct impact of Malone is difficult to discern.  The removal of Monte Ellis and addition of Andrew Bogut likely had a large impact on the Warriors’ offensive playbook.  However, the extent of this impact may not have been revealed through Bogut injury issues.

From set plays like the one above to entire offensive systems, the Warriors have undergone significant change during the last two seasons.  Sets such as the now-famous elevator play clearly suggest a dedication to taking advantage of the players’ strengths.

It is unlikely that Malone controlled the Warriors X’s and O’s to extent often reported.  Even if that were the case, do not expect a significant decline in the quality of the Warriors offensive and defensive sets, for though Malone may leave, he has already imparted his knowledge upon the rest of the staff, likely filled with equally brilliant basketball minds.

Could The Warriors Have Beaten The Memphis Grizzlies?

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Monday night, the San Antonio Spurs completed a sweep of the Memphis Grizzlies, securing a spot in the finals and leaving Memphis to join the 26 other teams watching the conference finals on TV.  Though Games 2 and 3 were decided in overtime, the Spurs appeared to be in control throughout the series.  San Antonio dispatched the Golden State Warriors in the second round, but appeared to struggle in the process, losing two games and overcoming a double-digit deficit in the fourth quarter of another.

San Antonio scored 104.4 points per 100 possessions to the Warriors in their second round series, and allowed 99.7, per nba.com.  In the four games versus Memphis, the Spurs scored 105.3 points per 100 possessions, and allowed 93.4.   During the regular season, the Grizzlies allowed only 100.3 points per 100 possessions, second only to the Indiana Pacers, and scored 104.9.  As was expected, Memphis affected San Antonio’s offensive production.  Memphis had been scoring at a top ten rate after the Rudy Gay trade, and likely needed to maintain at least average offensive production to beat San Antonio.  Instead, San Antonio held Memphis to an offensive rating 6.8 points per 100 possessions worse than the league-worst Washington Wizards’ season production.

Despite the drastic difference in performance versus San Antonio, the Warriors’ success relative to Memphis should not be perceived as superiority.  Though teams work to become versatile, performance in the NBA is often dictated by match-ups, and the Spurs are better equipped to overcome Memphis’ strengths and take advantage of their weaknesses than the Warriors.

Led by Zach Randolph and Marc Gasol, Memphis finished 15.7% of their offensive possessions with a post up, according to mysynergysports.com.  The post-up itself is not a very efficient offensive weapon.  The 8th ranked Grizzlies scored 0.86 points per play off post ups and 0.9 points per play overall.  However posting up, especially if it forces the defense to double team, as Randolph and Gasol often do, forces defenses to adjust, drawing help defenders, forcing rotations, and opening other opportunities for the offense.

The removal of David Lee skews the data, but the Warriors allowed 0.85 points per play to post ups this season, 19th in the league.  Andrew Bogut, as he showed against Tim Duncan, is a very good post defender, but the other Warriors defenders lack the size, strength, mobility, or defensive intelligence to be effective versus Randolph and Gasol.  San Antonio, conversely, allowed only 0.76 points per play to post ups, best in the league.

The more significant difference is between the two teams help strategies against post ups.

Here, the Warriors allow San Antonio to make a clean inbounds pass, leaving Tim Duncan isolated in the post against Carl Landry.  Only after Duncan has established deep post position, Klay Thompson leaves Manu Ginobili at the top of the key to help on Duncan.  Thompson’s help defense is not aggressive enough to affect Duncan’s move, but leaves Manu Ginobili wide open for three one pass from the ball.   The Grizzlies spot-up shooters are far less of a concern than San Antonio’s, making this defense still unacceptable defense less damaging. Even against Memphis, surrendering decent spot up opportunities is poor defense.  Though they ranked 28th in the league in spot up points play, the 0.9 points per play scored by Memphis of spot ups is equally efficient to their overall offense and more efficient than a post up field goal attempt.

Tiago Splitter and Tim Duncan give San Antonio the ability to defend post-ups without double-teaming.  Also, San Antonio’s pre-post up defense is generally more effective than the Warriors.  The Spurs’ wing defenders, especially Kawhi Leonard, are very good at harassing in bounds passers and helping on to posting big men prior to an entry pass.  Entry passes are made even more difficult by San Antonio’s commitment to fronting the post.

At 31 percent, the Grizzlies have the second highest offensive rebound percentage in the league. Memphis has the league’s 3rd least efficient offense off offensive rebounds, scoring 1.01 points per play according to mysynergysports.com.  But as with spot ups, Memphis’ inefficiency relative to the rest of the league does not mean plays ending in a shot off an offensive rebound are inefficient relative to Memphis’ own offense.  Of the categories tracked by Synergy, offensive rebounds is the third most efficient source of offense for the Grizzlies, trailing only cut and transition opportunities.

With David Lee off the court, the Warriors allowed a 58.6 percent offensive rebound percentage to shots by the opponent generated off offensive rebounds, compared to only 43.9 percent off a made field goal or free throw (To clarify: after the Warriors made a field goal or free throw, the Warriors allowed their opponents to shoot 43.9 percent adjusted field goal percentage) and 46.8 percent off a defensive rebound (meaning after the Warriors missed a field goal or free throw attempt, and the Warriors’ opponent rebounded, the Warriors opponent shot a 46.8 percent adjusted field goal percentage), according to nbawowy.com.  The Spurs allowed only 51.0 percent effective field goal percentage shooting after offensive rebounds.

Given the limited sample size of the Warriors’ without David Lee and with a healthy Andrew Bogut, it is difficult to predict the results of a hypothetical Memphis-Golden State series.  Perhaps the injuries to Stephen Curry and Andrew Bogut that affected their performance versus San Antonio may not have occurred, but given the injury history of those two players, that cannot be guaranteed.

Mike Conley and Tony Allen are elite on ball perimeter defenders and a threat to the Warriors hypothetical offensive production.  However, despite his on-ball prowess, Allen is not a consistent off ball defender, often straying off his man in misguided attempts to wreak havoc on opposing offenses.  Had Lionel Hollins chosen to defend Stephen Curry with Tony Allen, the Warriors use of Curry off the ball may have had more success than it did against the Spurs.  However, had Curry not injured his ankle he may never have shifted into this off ball role, in which case Allen and Conley may have drastically decreased his offensive efficiency.

While the Warriors would not be guaranteed a loss versus the Grizzlies, they would not be able to target Memphis’ weaknesses and limit their strengths as effectively as the Spurs.

Andrew Bogut and David Lee: Best Passing Big Men Tandem Ever?

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(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

The Golden State Warriors intended started big men, Andrew Bogut and David Lee, played only 31 games, 720 minutes, together for the season.  The Bogut-Lee frontoucourt has many strengths and many flaws.  But amid the rebounding success, transition struggles, and other features of the pair, the unique passing ability stands out.

Of all the Warriors 2-man lineups to log over 100 minutes, the Bogut-Lee pairing trailed only Lee-Jarrett Jack in assist percentage.   While the assist percentage team-dependent both Bogut and Lee are very good passers, and together, form one of the best passing big-men tandems in the league.

Both Lee and Bogut are excellent interior passers, consistently finding cutters and opposite big men for easy layups as defenses rotate, but the tandem’s passing talent expands beyond typical big men skills.

The Warriors offense relied on Bogut and Lee’s ability to find shooters out of a pick and roll.  Often on the move, Lee and Bogut balanced a scoring threat with the ability to launch a pinpoint pass to nearly anywhere on the court at angles and to players unexpected by the defense.  Of course, Bogut and Lee’s passing could not be truly enjoyed without the added flair they often provide.

To Bogut especially, this flair is often detrimental.  What could be a simple chest pass is often a one handed rocket.  To Bogut, a defender just adds an object around which a pass must be thread, and though the point result remains the same, added risk creates an apparent sense of accomplishment.  Though many of his passes are as enjoyable as any monster dunk, an unnecessary amount of turnovers are generated by Bogut’s forced passes.

While Bogut is guilty of overpassing, Lee goes through periods of limited court vision, especially with an open driving lane.  Lee makes many impressive passes but often fails to attempt simple ones.  On countless occasions Lee has missed an open Klay Thompson in the strong-side corner as he drives down the lane.

The Bogut-Lee frontcourt faces an inherent weakness as passers.  When the Warriors shifted to a small-ball lineup after Lee’s injury, they did not suffer from decreased ball movement, despite the removal of Lee, a very good passer, from the lineup.  The presence of two big men constantly within 17 feet of the basket limits spacing.  Small-ball lineups are generally known for opening driving opportunities, but the added spacing also creates passing lanes not available with two big men and their defenders clogging the middle of the court.

Along with Al Horford and Josh Smith, Boris Diaw and Tim Duncan, Marc Gasol and Zach Randolph, and many other big men tandems, Lee and Bogut consistently pressure defenses in ways most players cannot.

Though best ever is a stretch far greater than that into which Bogut and Lee force defenses, the pair may follow Divac-Webber and Gasol-Odom as the next great west coast passing tandem.

Could The Warriors Have Beaten San Antonio With A Healthy David Lee

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

For the many eliminated playoff teams, the weeks after elimination are a time of regret.  With the draft lottery looming, 14 teams are hoping for the fortune that eluded them during the regular season, leaving now-eliminated playoff teams to reflect on what could have been.  While many Warriors fans may be looking forward, eagerly waiting to build on this season’s playoff success, some may still be mired in frustration.

 

Among more enjoyable trends, injuries have been a central theme of this postseason, and as anyone reading this article has heard, the Warriors were not left unscathed.  David Lee tore his hip-flexor during Game 1 of the Warriors’ first round series against the Nuggets.  Lee was expected to miss the rest of the season, but played limited minutes versus San Antonio.

 

Lee did play a role off the bench, generally as an offensive interlude to begin the second quarter, but was drastically limited in role and effectiveness.  Playing almost entirely without their lone all-star, the Warriors lost 4-2, but contended in nearly every game.

 

The Spurs played consistently excellent defense on Stephen Curry and seemingly benefited from a severe injury to Curry’s ankle.  A healthy Lee demands defensive attention that may otherwise have been focused on Curry, and could have helped in freeing Curry offensively.  Lee is a very good offensive big man.  The Curry-Lee pick and roll was the staple of the Warriors’ productive regular season offense.  Per mysysnergysports.com, 20 percent of the Warriors offense was finished by a pick and roll ball handler or roll man.  This would be a significant portion without considering Lee, Curry, and other Warriors’ passing out of the pick and roll to other players after forcing defensive helping help.

 

So, it stands to reason that adding a fully healthy Lee would have drastically increased the Warriors chance at upsetting San Antonio, right?

 

Well, maybe not.  During the regular season, the healthy David Lee played in all four of the Warriors games versus San Antonio, totaling 155 minutes, about 38 minutes per game.  Though this is a small sample size, and the playoffs are a different situation, Lee did nothing in these minutes to signify that San Antonio would struggle with him in the playoffs.  The Spurs held Lee to a far below average 47.3 percent true shooting percentage, and Lee was not compensating for this in other areas.  Lee rebounded 17.8 percent of available rebounds, only slightly above his regular season 16.8 percent rebound percentage, and his assist percentage dropped from 16.8 percent to 12.1 percent.  Furthermore, Lee’s inefficiency and lack of creation did not come in a decoy role similar to Curry’s post-injury, but at a greater usage than his season average, meaning Lee’s offensive struggles had an increased impact.

With Lee on the court in the regular season versus San Antonio, the Warriors surrendered a respectable 101.1 points per 100 possessions, but only scored 99.6.  With David Lee off the court, the Warriors allowed only 98.9 points per 100 possessions, and scored 104.6.  While these sample sizes, especially the 42 possessions with Lee off the court are too small to be determinant, they do not suggest that a healthy Lee would have helped the Warriors.

 

In the series against San Antonio, the Warriors scored 101.9 points per 10 possessions, and allowed 105.9.  The Warriors had an offensive rating of 106.5 and a defensive rating of 105.5 during the regular season.  Their offense struggled against San Antonio during the playoffs, while the defense was only slightly worse than average.  However, in their two victories, the Warriors held San Antonio to 92 points per 100 possessions, and scored 102.7.  Elite defense, rather than elite offense seemed to be the Warriors winning formula versus San Antonio, and though David Lee helps an offense, his defense is damning.

 

Though some may find his precise passing majestic, Lee earned the nickname “Golden Gate” for a different reason.  Interior help defense is arguably the most important singular role in NBA defense.  Defenders, generally big men, must prevent opposing offenses from getting easy looks at the rim and finishing when they do.  Simply put, Lee protects the rim worse than almost every big man in the league.  With David Lee on the court, the Warriors’ opponents attempted 27.4 percent of their shots from zero to three feet, and converted 64.2 percent of those opportunities.  With Lee off, 25.8 percent of opponents’ attempts came from that range and only 60.8 percent were converted.  According to HoopData, the league average field goal percentage from three feet and in was 64.6 percent.  When David Lee came off the court, the Warriors improved from slightly above league average to fourth in the league at opponent field goal percentage within three feet.   If further evidence of Lee’s defensive deficiency is necessary, along with coining the name Golden Gate, Kirk Goldsberry detailed and attempted to explain this phenomenon for Grantland.

 

 

Lee’s poor defense extends beyond rim protection.  While the Warriors help schemes protect Lee in the pick and roll, Lee struggles to defend other offensive attacks.  Lee’s slow lateral speed leaves him vulnerable to drives, often forcing him to compensate by giving his man a wide-open jump shot.   According to Synergy, Lee allows 0.94 points per play to isolations, 275th in the league.  Lee’s poor positioning and effort have effects just as adverse as his foot-speed.  Lee rarely positions himself well to defend post ups (along with most other plays), allowing 0.84 points per play to post ups, 143rd in the league.

 

Though Lee’s offense is beneficial, a team like San Antonio is well prepared to exploit any and all defensive flaws presented by their opponent.  In Game 1 of the San Antonio-Memphis series, Tony Allen, widely considered an elite defender, was victimized by San Antonio’s ball movement as they repeatedly took advantage of his inconsistent off-ball defense.  The Warriors best performances versus San Antonio were more a result of productive defense than offense, and while a healthy Lee may have given the Warriors a new weapon against the Spurs offense, he often creates many more holes in the Warriors own armor.

 

Are the Warriors Better off With Stephen Curry in an off-ball roll?

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Early in Stephen Curry’s career, there was uncertainty as to whether he should play shooting guard or point guard.  Some thought Curry lacked the ball handling and court awareness to run the point.  Curry has put these concerns to rest, but there is still some public doubt as to which role maximizes Curry’s talents and the Warriors’ efficiency.

However, the Warriors still often use Curry in an off ball roll.  Throughout the games, the Warriors run series of screens designed to free Curry for a shot while another player, typically Jarrett Jack, runs the offense. These plays typically come in the form of a “floppy” set, in which Curry takes a series of staggered screens, generally looking for a corner three point attempt, while allowing structured reads and general improvisation through the play, or more simple pin-downs, which can result in a spot up look, but often lead into a pick and roll.

Along with their more basic sets, the Warriors have developed unique play designs, including the “Figure 8” set:

and the “Elevator Play”:

Curry is one of the league’s most effective off-ball shooters.  According to mysynergysports.com, Curry scores 1.35 points per play in spot-up situations, 5th in the league, and 1.07 points per play off screens, 20th in the league.

The Warriors use Curry off-ball throughout games, but much of his off ball play comes in the fourth quarter, when Jarrett Jack often runs the offense, with Curry spacing the floor.

Even off-ball, Curry demands the constant attention of the defense.  Curry’s defender often needs to chase him through screens and around the court, and the rest of the defense must hedge, trap, and deny screens to give Curry’s defender time to recover.  This often draws defensive help from the ball handler, allowing Jarrett Jack, Klay Thompson, and the other Warriors to attack with decreased defensive pressure.

However, the defensive attention drawn by Curry off ball does far less to benefit the Warriors than Curry’s on ball creation.  Curry scores effectively on-ball.  He is the league’s 27th best pick and roll ball handler and 32nd best isolation scorer in terms of points per play, and had an impressive assist percentage of 29.8 percent during the regular season.

Curry is able to create scoring opportunities for both himself and for teammates, and his teammates are much more efficient at converting the looks Curry generates for them than they are at attacking when Curry is playing an off-ball roll.  With David Lee no longer available to take advantage of defensive attention on Curry off-ball, Curry’s creation becomes even more necessary to the Warriors’ offense.

Can The Warriors Survive Without David Lee?

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(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

David Lee tore his right hip flexor in the fourth quarter of Saturday’s game versus the Denver Nuggets, and will be out the rest of the playoffs. With Lee expected to be ready for next year’s training camp, the rest of the Warriors will determine how many games he will miss.

Though often criticized, Lee has been vital to the Warriors success this season.  Lee is a member of each of the Warriors nine most-played lineups, only one of which has a negative net rating, according to nba.com, and is second on the Warriors in usage percentage among players playing more than five minutes per game, after Stephen Curry.

Curry is considered to be the offensive, “star” of the Warriors, but the team often equally relied on Lee’s passing to initiate the offense, and his scoring to finish it.  One of the most common features of the Warriors offense is the Curry-Lee pick and roll.  The Warriors, knowing that teams will often trap Curry, often run the pick and roll just to get Lee the ball in space, generally at the elbow opposite of where he set the screen.

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Lee shoots a respectable 42.9 percent from mid-range, and 58.2 percent from less than eight feet, enough to force the defense to rotate to deny him the shot or a lane to the basket.  As the defense rotates, Lee, an excellent passer, is consistently able to find his teammates for open opportunities.  According to mysynergysports.com, the Warriors end 16.6 percent of their offensive possessions with a spot-up, and 7.9 percent with a cut.  These opportunities are often generated by Lee’s excellent passing out of the pick and roll.  The Warriors score 1.03 points per play out of spot-ups, good for third in the league, and 1.27 off cuts, the second best production.  The Warriors have excellent shooters, but David Lee’s ability to draw the defense and set up his teammates is equally responsible for the Warriors success in these situations.

So, can the Warriors replace David Lee’s production?  In two of the three games David Lee missed this season, Carl Landry replaced him in the starting lineup. Landry is capable of a reasonable Lee impersonation.  He shoots 43.6 percent from midrange, often off the pick and roll, typically with Jarrett Jack, and could likely replicate Lee’s rebounding, as his total rebounding percentage is only 2.6 percent lower than Lee’s.

However, Landry and Andrew Bogut have yet to appear on the court together this season, and starting Landry would leave the Warriors without a capable scoring big man off the bench.  Also, though Landry scores well out of the pick and roll at 0.98 points per play, according to mysynergysports.com, he cannot replicate Lee’s passing, leaving the Warriors to run a less imposing version of their normal offense.  Like Lee, Landry would struggle to defend Nuggets forward Wilson Chandler, but may be able to score on Chandler in the post.

Though Mark Jackson has been hesitant to go small all season, with Bogut playing well, the Warriors could start Jarrett Jack, and start Harrison Barnes at power forward.   According to 82games.com, Barnes has only played about 1 percent of the Warriors’ minutes at power forward, and due to Bogut’s inconsistent health and Jackson’s apparent disdain for small ball, the Curry-Jack-Thompson-Barnes-Bogut lineup did not record a single possession all season. However, shortly after Lee’s injury Saturday, the Warriors played that exact lineup, though only for three possessions.

The small ball lineup presents an opportunity for the Warriors to adopt a Houston Rockets spread pick and roll style offense, with Bogut setting screens while three off ball perimeter players are ready to shoot or attack a close-out.  Barnes is capable of guarding Wilson Chandler, though a healthy Kenneth Faried would pose some problems on the defensive glass, but most importantly, playing Barnes at the four could help free up Stephen Curry.

In game one, the Nuggets did an excellent job denying Curry any decent shot opportunities.  They trapped off pick and rolls, hedged off ball screens, and refused to allow Curry to consistently score.  The Nuggets would still trap off Bogut, but without a second Warrior big man in the lane to help off of, Denver would be forced to recover sooner or help on Bogut off of wing capable of hitting the three or attacking the lane, where there would likely only be one Nugget able to help.

The Warriors are often at their best when Harrison Barnes is aggressive offensively.  Without Lee’s defender to clog the paint, Barnes will have an easier time attacking, and finishing at the rim.

Though overcoming Lee’s absence will likely require some incredible performances from Stephen Curry, the injury does present opportunities for the Warriors to experiment with lineups for future seasons.