(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

On a night when Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, and Jarrett Jack all struggled offensively, it was Denver’s dominant frontcourt play along with a stellar game from Andre Iguodala, not the Warriors’ offensive struggles that propelled the Nuggets to victory.  Reminiscent of the performances continually surrendered by the Warriors in the pre-Bogut era, the Kenneth Faried, Javale McGee, Kosta Koufos big rotation scored efficiently, protected the paint, and controlled nearly every rebound.

Here are three keys to prevent a repeat performance in Game 6:

Decrease Transition Leak Outs:

To decrease the production of the Denver big men, the Warriors should limit wing players’ attempts at leaking out in transition.  The Nuggets, Corey Brewer especially, are famous for sprinting up the court as or even before a shot is released.  The Warriors are generally not overly aggressive in transition, but would benefit if wing players, especially Harrison Barnes, more consistently crashed the boards, limiting offensive rebounding opportunities by the Denver big men.  Avoiding transition leak-outs would leave more players in position to defend a Denver big off a rebound without forcing the Warriors to surrender much offensively.

The Warriors benefit from transition opportunities, but not in the typical sense.  Rarely does Golden State attack the rim on a non-turnover generated fast break.  Instead, they take advantage of mismatches and a retreating defense in “semi-transition,” seeking open three-pointers and exposed driving lanes.  Often, Klay Thompson, Harrison Barnes, and other Warriors wings will run straight to the corner-three, not to the basket, in transition opportunities.

The Warriors exceeded defensive rebounding expectations through the first five games of the series, but would not want to repeat the Game 6 performance.

More aggressive roll man help:

Throughout the regular season, the Warriors relied on wing defenders to help down on rolling big men as much as any team in the league.  Likely looking to compensate for David Lee’s weak pick-and-roll defense, the Warriors’ defenders consistently “bumped” big man, then scrambled to recover to shooters.  As a product of this help, David Lee, a below-average defender, finished ninth in the league in pick-and-roll roll man defense, according to mysynergysports.com.  These commitments did not come without consequence, as the Warriors surrendered the three point attempts per game in the NBA, according to hoopdata.com.

Against the Denver Nuggets the reprimands for over-helping may not be as severe.  During the regular season, Denver, with an adjusted field goal percentage from beyond the arc of 51.1 percent, was the 24^th best three-point shooting team in the league.  By more aggressively helping onto rolling big men, the Warriors will be able to limit Denver’s bigs’ production, and allow the Warriors big men to hedge more aggressively on Ty Lawson.

Draw Fouls at the Rim:

The Warriors rarely get to the rim, averaging only 22.1 attempts at the rim per game, 29^th in the league, and draw fouls at a below average rate when they do.  The According to basketball-reference, the Warriors average .201 free-throw attempts per field goal attempt, below the league average of .204.  Stephen Curry, the Warriors primary ball handler, and Klay Thompson, another high usage player, both have incredibly low free throw rates.  However, drawing fouls on the Nuggets big men, especially the foul-prone Javale McGee, is the easiest way to limit their productivity.  Instead of focusing on finishing the shot, Curry, Thomson, and the rest of the Warriors should emphasize drawing contact.

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Throughout the series, the Denver Nuggets have appeared to be committed to allowing any Golden State Warrior but Stephen Curry to beat them.  Following Denver’s Game 2 loss George Karl said, “the game plan was to keep the ball out of Stephen Curry’s hands…”  The Nuggets have fully committed to this strategy, and Stephen Curry has beaten them anyway.

NBA offenses are, or at least should be, designed to put players in situations that take advantage of their skill set, while defenses are designed to prevent these opportunities. Denver considers Curry the Warriors’ primary offensive threat and has adjusted accordingly, attempting to deny Curry any open attempts. What Denver has failed to realize is that Curry’s transcendent, all-time great shooting ability changes the definition of a “good shot.”

After penetrating off trapped pick and roll, Curry drives the lane, then kicks to the perimeter, forcing the Nuggets to rotate to cover an open Harrison Barnes in the left corner. Ty Lawson closes out, and Barnes passes to Bogut, who finds Curry in the corner. Wilson Chandler was in nearly perfect defensive position, and closes out well on Curry. Chandler takes a split-step to square himself so Curry cannot drive past him, but makes the fatal mistake of lowering his hand. Curry is known for his jump-shooting accuracy, but, along with his unlimited range and ability to shoot off the dribble, it is his lightning-quick release that separates him from the typical knockdown shooter.  Chandler realizes Curry is about to shoot, and lunges to contest the shot.

Unlike most players, Stephen Curry is not bothered by contests.  To disrupt Curry’s shot, a defender often has to literally block the ball.  Curry knocks down a three-point attempt that against a normal shooter would be considered contested, moving him to 5-of-6 from the left corner for the series.

Leading to this made three-pointer, Curry drove right on Andre Miller, crossed back towards the middle of the court and pulled up. As soon as Curry gathered, Corey Brewer lunged to contest the shot.  Denver has two men guarding Curry before the shot is released, once again appearing to deny Curry open opportunities.

Many point guards are heralded for their “court vision,” but for Curry, the term takes a different meaning.  Curry is constantly aware of the position of defenders, and their ability to affect his jump shot.  This spatial awareness, not the mere presence of defenders, often dictates whether Curry is “open” on a seemingly contested shot.

Again, two Nuggets are pressuring Curry, but neither can really affect the shot. As Ethan Sherwood Strauss explained, when defended by Lawson during the regular season, Curry would shoot without regard to the shorter Lawson’s defense.

This is likely not a shot Denver minds Curry taking, but by pulling up so far from the basket, Curry is able to take an uncontested, rhythm jump shot.  Curry has made eight of his 26 attempts from 25 to 34 feet, according to NBA.com, compared to 12-of-8 from 20 to 24 feet. Though this may seem to be an inefficient shot, 8-of-26 from beyond the arc results in an adjusted field goal percentage of 51.9 percent, 1.3 percent better than the Warriors’ team adjusted field goal percentage during the regular season.

Denver has relied on longer forwards Andre Iguodala and Corey Brewer to guard Curry for much of the series, but has been hesitant to fully commit to this strategy.  In the first two games, Klay Thompson took advantage of Denver’s cross-matching of Iguodala on Curry and Lawson on Thompson by repeatedly scoring out of the mid-post, hitting jumpers over the shorter Lawson, and attacking the paint. In Games 3 and 4, Denver has avoided replicating this experience, instead allowing Lawson or Miller to defend Curry for significantly more minutes.  Corey Brewer has defended Curry, but Denver likely fears that a Brewer, Iguodala line-up would compromise spacing to the point that defending both Curry and Thompson is not worth the offensive struggle.

Lawson and Miller, unfortunately for Denver, have been unable to slow Curry.  Instead of running pick and rolls to draw extra defenders, Curry isolates against the slower Miller and shorter Lawson, often resulting in an open mid-range jumper.  Mid-range jumpers are typically considered the worst field goal attempt for an offense, but again, Curry cannot be judged by normal standards.  This series, Curry is shooting 54.5 percent on mid-range jumpers, according to nba.com, plenty efficient enough to justify the attempts.

On defense, Curry has generally defended either Lawson or Miller, meaning that even when Iguodala or Brewer is meant to defend Curry, by running in transition Curry is either able to dictate matchups or find open transition three-point attempts as Denver scrambles to switch.

While Derrick Rose, Russell Westbrook, and other dynamic guards are redefining the point guard position, Stephen Curry has presented a dramatically different approach to being both a point guard and a scorer, and the Nuggets have yet to fully adapt.

(Written For Blue Man Hoop)

What was once an intriguing stop in the Nuggets playoff path has become a likely upset.  Following a game four victory, the Warriors will seek to spare the Nuggets the expense of a return trip to Oakland and complete the gentleman’s sweep.  In the meantime, each Warrior must be assigned a relatively arbitrary grade evaluating their performance in Game 4.   Though I despise this practice among teachers, these grades will be assigned based on performance relative to ability, not to objective performance.  Why?  As a generally pessimistic fan, I promised to judge the Warriors playoff performance based not on aggregate results, but on performance relative to my low expectations.  Of course, the Warriors have vastly exceeded those expectations to such a degree that even the aggregate results are hyperbolically impressive.

Stephen Curry:          A+

Despite a quiet first half scoring-wise, Curry was once again outstanding, scoring 31 points on 10-16 shooting.  In the 33 minutes Curry played, the Warriors outscored the Nuggets by 21 points.  Curry’s third quarter scoring barrage sunk the Nuggets, but by drawing constant attention, he kept the Warriors afloat throughout the game, setting up teammates both with his passing and by forcing the Nuggets to overcommit to on and off ball screen defense.  For those who do not appreciate the oral beauty of Steph Curry’s shooting, here is a more visual rendition.

Jarrett Jack:    A+

The Nuggets focused their defensive attention on Curry, and Jack took full advantage, scoring 21 points on 9 field goal attempts.  The constantly probing Jack also dished out 9 assists, and played 42 minutes.  The Nuggets generally placed their best perimeter defenders, Andre Igoudala and Corey Brewer, on Curry, leaving Jack to score on the smaller Ty Lawson and slower Andre Miller.  While it was Steph Curry who ignited the blowout, Jack was the steady hand guiding the Warriors to victory.

Klay Thompson:        C+

Thompson finished with 13 points on 5 of 10 shooting, and played a team-high 43 minutes.  Unlike the first two games, Thompson was not a focus of the Warriors offense, and unlike Game 3, he was not completely forgotten.  He guarded Andre Iguodala for the majority of his minutes, contributing both to his 19 points on 7 of 11 shooting and to his 7 turnovers.  Iguodala did make some difficult, contested shots over Thompson, but also took advantage of Thompson’s confused off ball defense to find cutting lanes and open three-point attempts.  For several possessions, Thompson defended Lawson, who was able to score, but with far less ease than in his earlier minutes defended by Jarrett Jack.

Andrew Bogut:          A

Adding to a typically solid defensive night, Bogut had his best offensive performance of the season.  The Nuggets decided to trap Curry off pick and rolls, and committed for even longer than they have throughout the series, giving Bogut the space to attack the rim and find Warriors shooters.  Through the first three games, Bogut was hesitant upon receiving the pass from Curry after setting a screen, but tonight, was ferociously aggressive, mixing a few fancy passes with his assaults on the rim. This was the Bogut the Warriors envisioned in the Monte Ellis trade.

Harrison Barnes:       C-

Harrison Barnes played an ineffectual 31 minutes, balancing decent but not game-changing defense with inefficient offense.  Barnes contributed to the struggles of several Nuggets, but, after two promising performances, seemed to have no great effect on the outcome of this game.

Draymond Green:     A+

This was quite possibly Green’s best game of the season.  In 25 minutes off the bench, the rookie scored 13 points on 5-8 shooting, had 6 rebounds and 4 steals, and contributed to the Warriors outscoring the Nuggets by 15 points over his playing time.  Green made 2 shots from behind the arc, and played aggressive defense on several Nuggets, including Ty Lawson, Andre Miller, and Andre Iguodala.  This game was the ideal example of what the Warriors hope to receive from Draymond Green in the future.

Carl Landry    B+

Continuing his player-option playoff tour, Landry scored 17 points and 11 field goal attempts, and, though he only played 18 minutes, helped the Warriors punish Denver for trapping pick and roll ball handlers.

(Written for Blue Man Hoop)

Following David lee’s season-ending injury, there was debate over the Warriors options at power forward.  The Barnes at power forward lineup promoted for its offensive promise, was feared to leave the Warriors defenseless against Denver’s offensive rebounding.  Denver lead NBA with a 31.4 percent offensive rebounding percentage, boosted by the hyperactive Kenneth Faried, who had the league’s 6^th best offensive rebound percentage.

The return of Kenneth Faried from a severe ankle sprain was expected to cause significant matchup problems for the Warriors.  A healthy Faried is too strong for Harrison Barnes, and too quick for Carl Landry.  However, the Warriors held Faried to only 4 points and 4 rebounds in 21 minutes.

Much of Faried’s decreased production may be attributed to his ankle injury.  Faried’s decreased lateral mobility was clear in his pick and roll coverage, and contributed to his inability to produce offensively or rebound effectively.

As this graphic from popcornmachine.net shows, the Warriors never allowed Faried to take advantage of Harrison Barnes.  Faried was never on the floor without one of Carl Landry, Draymond Green, Festus Ezeli, or Andrew Bogut matched up against him.  Because of Faried’s decreased mobility, he was restricted against defenders of equal strength.

Also, at the end of the second and third quarters, and the beginning of the fourth, Faried played without Kosta Koufos or Javale McGee in the lineup.  According to nbawowy.com, in 1142 possessions played with neither McGee nor Koufos on the court, Faried posted an offensive rebounding rate of 13.4 percent, and a true-shooting percentage of 61.6 percent, 4.3 percent higher than his season average.  When playing without Denver’s main centers, Faried typically excels offensively, but the Warriors were able to limit his opportunities and production.  On a typical offensive possession, Faried will run the baseline, set high screens, and actively cut through the paint, but in game two, he was often restricted to waiting in the low block, or setting high screens and ineffectively rolling.  Faried was not as aggressive as expected, but the Warriors did actively attempt to limit his space offensively.  When Andre Iguodala or Corey Brewer, 31.7 and 29.6 percent shooters from behind the arc respectively, were on the same side as Faried on the roll, Iguodala and Brewer’s defenders would consistently crash down to pressure Faried’s dive to the rim, allowing his man to recover.  Faried played several minutes with Anthony Randolph, to whom the Warriors gave little respect defensively.  Warriors defenders often helped off Randolph to pressure Faried in the pick and roll.  The may have over-committed to this strategy, as Randolph, a former Warrior, had 14 points on 5 of 6 shooting.

Kenneth Faried’s ability to pressure the Warriors’ defense and gain extra possessions for the Nuggets will be influential throughout the series.  As the Warriors showed in game two, they are fully capable of stopping a limited Faried. How they react if Faried regains his mobility as the series progresses remains a vital question in determining this suddenly competitive first round series.